Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah v. Alfred P. Katoa : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Catherine E. Lilly; Deborah Kreeck Mendez; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Katoa, No. 981699 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1861

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
i:'

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee*

<

!

•* /' ;•'

Case No. 981699-CA

vs.
A L F R E D

R

K A T O A

^

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR TWO
COUNTS OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207(1) (1995),
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD PRESIDING.
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM, Bar No. 1231
Utah Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
CATHERINE E. LILLY
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant

PM..ED
appeals
1W

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

Summary of Trial Proceedings

3

Summary of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

ARGUMENT

6

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE
PRISON TERMS FOR AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE

6

A. The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing Two Consecutive
Prison Terms of Zero-to-Five Years for Automobile
Homicide Which Resulted in Five Deaths Is Reasonable

8

B. The Trial Court Properly Considered All Legally
Relevant Factors in Sentencing

9

1. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity
and Circumstances of the Offense
2.

3.

10

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's
History

16

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's
Character

20

-i-

4. The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's
Rehabilitative Needs

21

C. Defendant's Claim that the Consecutive Prison Terms
Violated the Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah
Constitution is Without Merit

25

CONCLUSION

26

ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A (Presentence Investigation Report)
ADDENDUM B (Transcript of Sentencing)
ADDENDUM C (Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence or in the Alternative Motion to
Amend Judgment)

ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Weston. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971)

17

STATE CASES
James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1998)

15

Rawlings v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958 (Utah App. 1994)

24

State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986)

22

State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998)

10, 12, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25

State v. Gambrell. 814 P.2d 1136 (Utah App. 1991)

13, 14

State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)

7, 9, 10, 26

State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985)

10

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)

18

State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)

18

State v. Lipskv. 639 P.2d 174 (Utah 1981)

17, 19

State v. McKenna. 728 P.2d 984 (Utah 1986)
State v. Nutall. 861 P.2d454 (Utah App. 1993)
State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997)
State v.Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984)
State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995)

17
10, 22
2
1,6
1, 2, 7, 9, 25, 26
10, 12, 23, 24, 25

-iii-

State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988)

State v. Strunk. 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993)

12

7, 9, 11, 12,22, 23, 24, 25

State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534 (Utah App. 1997)

17

STATE STATUTES
Cal. Veh. Code § 12507 (Deering 1972)

9

Utah Const, art I, § 9 (1991)

2, 6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1997)

2, 7, 9, 10, 21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995)

1, 3, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

Utah R. Crim. P. 11

15

-iv-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 981699-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ALFRED P. KATOA,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
it Jc ic

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of automobile
homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (1995). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue on Appeal. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it sentenced
defendant to two indeterminate prison terms of zero-to-five years, to be served consecutively,
for his conviction on two counts of automobile homicide?
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984); see
also State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,651 (Utah App. 1997). Therefore, the appellate court
will not overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it finds an abuse of discretion.
1

Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). An
abuse of discretion may be found if the sentencing is inherently unfair, is clearly excessive,
or is imposed without considering all legally relevant factors. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.
Nevertheless, the court "may find an abuse of discretion only if [it] conclude[s] that 'no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."' Id. (quoting State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions and statutes is
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal:
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 9 (1991):
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed;
nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1997):
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
* * *

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
* * *

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged by Information with five counts of manslaughter, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995). R. 2-6. Pursuant to a plea
bargain, the State filed an Amended Information charging defendant with two counts of
automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1)
(1995), and defendant entered pleas of guilty to both counts. R. 27, 36-38. After receiving
a Presentence Investigation Report1 (PSI) and hearing from defendant, defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and family members of two victims, the court sentenced defendant to two
consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years. R. 47-48, 76.2 Thereafter, defendant filed a
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence or in the Alternative Motion to Amend Judgment
("Motion to Correct Sentence") asking that the trial court amend or alter the judgment to
provide concurrent sentences.3 T. 51-53. The trial court denied the motion and defendant
timely filed a notice of appeal. T. 58, 60.

!

The PSI prepared for defendant is attached in Addendum A. The PSI is located in
a large manila envelope identified at page 75 in the index. Defendant's PSI will simply
be cited as PSI followed by the page number (e.g., PSI at 3). Also in the manila
envelope, R. 75, is the presentence investigation report prepared for the co-defendant,
Aisea Akauola. Akauola's PSI will be cited herein as PSI-Akauola.
2

The sentencing transcript, which is reflected in the record at page 76, is attached
in Addendum B and will be cited herein as "TOS," e.g., TOS at 23.
3

The Motion to Correct Sentence is attached in Addendum C.
3

Aisea Akauola ("Akauola"), a co-defendant in the case, was also charged with five
counts of manslaughter. PSI-Akauola at 2. Like defendant, Akauola pled guilty to two
counts of automobile homicide as charged in an amended information. Id. Akauola was also
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of zero to five years. TOS at 24.
SUMMARY OF FACTS 4

On July 24,1997, defendant and several others, including Aisea Akauola, participated
in a rugby tournament at the Granger High School rugby field. PSI at 2, 4; PSI-Akauola at
4. Following play that day, many from the group, including defendant and Akauola,
remained at the park into the afternoon drinking beer and smoking marijuana. PSI at 2-4.
At approximately three o'clock that afternoon, West Valley City police officers responded
to the group's location on a reported DUI involving a black jeep. PSI at 2. The officers did
not effect any arrests, but emptied several beer cans found at the site, notified the group that
drinking was not allowed on the grounds, and requested that they leave. PSI at 2.
Thereafter, defendant and five others left the park in a van to go to a friend's house.
PSI at 2, 4. Defendant drove the van even though someone had asked him to move out of
the driver's seat because of the level of his intoxication. PSI at 3. Defendant later admitted
to authorities that he had smoked two marijuana "joints" and drank four beers while at the

4

Because neither a trial nor a preliminary hearing was held in this case, the facts
cited in this brief are taken primarily from the Probable Cause Statement in the
Information and the presentence investigation reports.
4

park.5 PSI at 3. Akauola apparently followed defendant in the black jeep.6 PSI at 4. As the
vehicles traveled westbound on a residential street with a speed limit of 35 m.p.h., Akauola
passed defendant and cut in front of him. R. 4; PSI at 4. Defendant then moved his vehicle
left of center and proceeded to pass or race along side Akauola's jeep at a high rate of speed.
R. 4; PSI at 2, 4. As the two vehicles sped down the residential street, they apparently
brushed against each other. R. 4; PSI at 2. Defendant's van then collided with an oncoming
automobile after which it careened into a parked, flatbed trailer.7 R. 4; PSI at 2. The jeep
also collided with the trailer, coming to rest in the undercarriage of the trailer. R. 4; PSI at
2. The two vehicles were later estimated to be traveling at speeds of 79 to 81 m.p.h. R. 4;
PSI at 3.
Five people were killed as a result of the accident: the two occupants in the eastbound
automobile and three passengers in defendant's van. R. 4; PSI at 3. The remaining two
passengers in the van were also transported to the hospital with injuries and were still

5

Blood samples taken from defendant later that day revealed a blood alcohol
content of .02% and a metabolite for marijuana with nonquantitative results. PSI at 3.
6

Blood samples taken from Akauola later that day revealed a blood alcohol content
of .11% and a metabolite for marijuana with nonquantitative results. PSI at 3.
7

Defendant reported to the investigating officer that the jeep hit the side of his van
prior to the accident. PSI at 4. Akauola's version of events was somewhat different. He
indicated that as he sped up when the van attempted to pass him, a car pulled out and the
van ran into the car and then bounced into the jeep. PSI-Akauola at 4. The official
version set forth in the PSI indicates that the jeep sped up and/or swerved into the van to
prevent it from passing. PSI at 2. The Probable Cause Statement attached to the
Information simply indicates that the vehicles brushed against each other and they lost
control. R. 4.
5

recovering almost a year later.8 R. 4; PSI at 3, 6-7. Three occupants in the jeep, including
Akauola, were also transported to the hospital with injuries. PSI at 3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
prison terms. The record, however, clearly demonstrates otherwise. The sentence was
reasonable in light of the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the sentencing judge duly
considered the gravity and circumstances of the offense, together with the history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of defendant.
Defendant also contends that the consecutive prison terms violated the "unnecessary
rigor" clause in article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. However, defendant failed to
preserve below, and adequately argue on appeal, his claim that the consecutive sentences
violated the provision. In any case, the unnecessary rigor clause applies to the treatment of
prisoners and not to terms of incarceration.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS
FOR AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion

of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant
has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or
8

One of the survivors was in a coma for more than a month following the accident
and his family reported that he is "not all with it" mentally and may never fully recover.
R. 4; PSI at 6.
6

consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-401(4).
Although the courts have opined that Utah's sentencing statute favors concurrent
sentencing, see State v. Strunk, 846P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993),9 an appellate court will not
overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it is clear that the trial court abused its
discretion. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). As the supreme court in Gerrard observed, "[t]o do
otherwise would have a chilling effect on the trial court which has the main responsibility
for sentencing." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial
court fails to consider the statutory factors or if the sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair
or clearly excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. However, an "appellate court can properly
find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.
A review of the record in this case reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years on each of the two
9

In so observing, the supreme court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) which
provides: "Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the
sentence that they shall run consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301.
7

counts to which he pleaded guilty. The consecutive sentences were reasonable and the trial
court considered all statutory factors..
A.

The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing Two Consecutive Prison Terms
of Zero-to-Five Years for Automobile Homicide Which Resulted in
Five Deaths Is Reasonable.

Defendant was originally charged with five counts of manslaughter, a second degree
felony, for his conduct on July 24,1997, which resulted in the deaths of five people. R. 2-6.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty, not to five counts, but to only two counts
of the reduced offense of automobile homicide, a third degree felony. R. 27, 36-38.
Defendant was not required to answer charges for the deaths of three individuals.
The gravity and circumstances of the offenses cannot be understated. The accident
was so devastating that one officer reported that upon arrival, he thought dispatch had made
a mistake reporting the incident as an automobile accident. PSI at 18. Based on the property
damage and ''condition of the dead, dying, and injured," the officer believed he had arrived
instead at the scene of a massive explosion. Id. Killed in the accident were the occupants
in the eastbound automobile, Helene R. Sherlin and her husband, Robert Sherlin, and three
passengers in defendant's van, Sione Pilivi, Selanito Sitani, and Amanaki Moala. R. 4; PSI
at 3. Another passenger in the van, Lamu Tongamana, was in a coma for more than a month
and is not expected to ever fully recover mentally. R. 4; PSI at 6.
The trial court characterized, and perhaps understated, defendant's conduct as an
"almost absolute and total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people." TOS at 2324. Defendant drove even though someone had asked him not to do so because he or she
8

believed defendant was impaired. PSI at 3. He attempted to pass his friend on the crowded,
residential street at speeds of approximately 80 m.p.h., R. 4; PSI at 3, conduct which even
a child would recognize as "suicide/' much less a veteran driver of presumably fourteen
years.10
Given defendant's willful conduct in operating the vehicle in the manner he chose, his
disregard for the lives and safety of others, and the tragic consequences of defendant's willful
acts, it cannot "be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Indeed, although not the test on appeal, the opposite can
be said: all reasonable people would impose consecutive prison terms.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Considered All Legally Relevant Factors
in Sentencing.

As noted above, section 76-3-401 (4), Utah Code Ann., requires the court to "consider
the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant." Failure to consider these factors can result in an abuse of discretion.
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. However, defendant concedes that "all the mitigating
information'' was before the trial court. Aplt. Brf. at 9-10, n. 2. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to serve consecutive prison terms.

10

The supposition that defendant had driven for fourteen years is based on his age
of thirty and the typical driving age of sixteen in most states, including California from
where he moved. PSI at 1, 11-12; see Cal. Veh. Code § 12507 (Deering 1972) (repealed
in 1997 by Stats. 1997, c. 760 (S.B. 1329), § 2) (similar substantive provisions now set
forth in Cal. Veh. Code. § 12814.6 (Deering 1997)).
9

Defendant's underlying premise on appeal is that the court placed too much emphasis
on the gravity and circumstances of the offense and not enough emphasis on other factors.
Defendant essentially asks this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial courtr
Such is not the duty of the Court. The statute requires only that the court consider these
factors, not that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (4); see also State
v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing judge will give
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other
factors."); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating
him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the court," which endeavors to impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and
law before it." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The record in this case reveals that the trial court
did, in fact, duly consider all statutory factors and acted within its discretion in imposing the
sentence.
1.

The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity and Circumstances
of the Offense.

As previously explained, supra, at 8-9, the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
cannot be understated. Unlike the case in State v. GallU 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), where
the defendant "did not inflict any physical injuries on his victims," defendant inflicted the
ultimate physical injury on his victims. Unlike the case in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah
1995), defendant did not just inflict severe injury on his victims, but caused their needless

10

deaths. Unlike the case in State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), defendant did not
cause the death of one person, but caused the needless deaths of five people and forever
changed the lives of their families. The lives of Helene Sherlin, Robert Sherlin, Sione Pilivi,
Selanito Sitani, and Amanaki Moala were prematurely cut short by defendant's willful acts.
The life of Lamu Tongamana was irreversibly changed. See PSI at 6 (he is not expected to
ever fully recover mentally). Yet, had defendant acted with any ounce of foresight or
common sense, had he acted in a manner that respected human life, no tragedy would have
occurred. See PSI at 10 (wherein defendant states that he never would have acted the way
he did had he known the outcome of that day).
Defendant's Almost Absolute Disregard for Others. Although defendant did not
intentionally kill the victims, he did, as the trial court found, act with an "almost absolute and
total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people" resulting in the deaths of five
people. TOS at 23-24. Given the conditions at the time, defendant's conduct was not simply
an exercise of poor judgment as he now contends, but a wanton disregard for the lives of
others. The level of defendant's culpability was perhaps best described by the eldest son of
Robert and Helene Sherlin:
What [defendant and Akauola] did is the equivalent of firing a loaded
gun haphazardly into a crowd. Does the fact that the gunman did not take
actual aim[] [mean that he] wasn't [] responsible] for his actions? No, the
death of my parents was not an accident. Both of these men behaved in an
extremely reckless and deadly fashion. Either one of them could have backed
down and behaved in a rationale [sic] and civilized fashion. Neither did.
TOS at 14, 15.
11

Defendant asserts that although he reminded the court at sentencing that he did not
behave with any malice, the court failed to give any consideration to this fact when it
imposed the sentence. Aplt. Brf. at 13. Defendant's claim is not supported by the record.
The court first noted that defendant "is not as evil as some of the people" seen in court. TOS
at 23. Moreover, the court's finding that defendant's conduct constituted an "almost absolute
and total disregard for the lives and the safety of other people" was an implicit recognition
that defendant did not act intentionally.11
Defendant's argument appears to assume the legal proposition that the trial court
abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive prison terms for crimes that are not committed
intentionally or maliciously. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Defendant cites to Strunk, Smith, and
Galli, in which the supreme court vacated consecutive sentences for intentional crimes, as
support for this proposition. Id. However, defendant's reliance on these decisions for such
a proposition is misplaced. These decisions, which are discussed in greater detail infra, at
21 -24, did not rest on or even discuss the culpable mental states of the accused. The fact that
courts have vacated consecutive sentences for intentional crimes does not, a fortiori, prohibit
consecutive sentences for crimes involving a lower culpable mental state. Moreover, had the

1

defendant indicates that he did not act with malice aforethought. However, the
term malice aforethought was long ago abandoned with the adoption of the current
criminal code. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 258 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, the
supreme court in Standiford observed that "[s]ince the term 'malice aforethought' is a
confusing carry-over from prior law and can lead to confusion, if not error, it should no
longer be used." Id. at 258-59. As such, the State will address defendant's challenge in
terms of the actor's mental state as defined under the current criminal code, e.g.,
"intentionally."
12

legislature intended to restrict the imposition of consecutive sentences in this manner, it
could have expressly so provided in the language of the statute.
The imposition of consecutive prison terms for automobile-related homicide is not
unprecedented in Utah. InStatev. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136,1137 (Utah App. 1991),atruck
driver's brakes failed as he was driving a large truck loaded with 78,000 pounds of steel
down a grade. In an effort to stop the truck, the driver steered across the opposing lane of
traffic toward a hillside. Id. As he did so, however, a car came around the bend and collided
with the truck, killing all three occupants in the car. Id. At trial, the State established that
the driver's brakes had not been adjusted in accordance with federal or state requirements.
Id. The driver also conceded that the brakes had not been adjusted since he left Tennessee.
Id. The driver was convicted of three counts of negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor,
and was sentenced to three consecutive one-year jail terms. Id. Without discussion, this
Court upheld the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms as properly within its
discretion. Id. at 1141. As the Court in Gambrell observed, other jurisdictions have also
upheld consecutive sentences for automobile-related homicide involving multiple victims.
Id. at 1140 & n. 4 (citing, among others, State v. Whitley, 382 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1964); State
v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1986)).
Defendant's Impaired State. By his own admission, defendant had consumed four
beers and smoked two marijuana joints at the park. PSI at 3. In fact, he was asked not to
drive due to his intoxication. Id. Nevertheless, defendant disregarded the request and drove

13

anyway. Id. Defendant then proceeded to race down a crowded, residential street at speeds
of approximately 80 m.p.h.12 Id.; R. 4.
In his brief, defendant attempts to minimize the level of his intoxication, arguing that
neither the marijuana nor the alcohol impaired his driving, and should not, therefore, have
been treated as contributing factors to the accident. Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. Defendant claims
that the trial court unduly focused on his alcohol and marijuana use, failing "to acknowledge
related mitigating information that actually shows [defendant's] drinking and smoking to be
rather limited." Id. at 13. Specifically, defendant contends that the court failed to recognize
as mitigating factors the blood test results indicating a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .02
and a marijuana metabolite with nonquantitative results. Defendant's claim in this regard is
beyond reason. The presence of either substance in his system can hardly be considered a
mitigating factor.
In any case, that the court was fully aware of and considered these factors is apparent
from the record. The PSI indicated that defendant's blood tests revealed a marijuana
metabolite with nonquantitative results and a BAC of .02. PSI at 3. Moreover, defense
counsel expressly brought to the court's attention at sentencing the fact that defendant had

12

Defendant claims that he was traveling 60 m.p.h., a speed "much lower" than that
estimated by the police. Aplt. Brf. at 4. Defendant's contention that he was traveling 60
m.p.h. is not supported by the record. Defendant's accident reconstructionist did not
estimate the speed, but contended that due to certain factors, "a realistic calculation is
impossible." PSI, attached letter from David G. Lord dated June 1, 1998. In any case,
that the vehicles were traveling well in excess of the speed limit can hardly be questioned.
One veteran officer who responded to the scene indicated that he had never seen an
accident that equaled this accident in his twenty-four years on the force. PSI at 8.
14

a BAC of .02.. TOS at 4. That the court took into account defendant's relatively low BAC
at sentencing is apparent from the court's comment that Akauola (who had a BAC of .11%)
"had a much higher blood alcohol level than [defendant]." TOS at 11.
Defendant also argues that he "was not legally drunk and was fit to drive" because he
"had a [BAC] of only .02 at the time of the accident." Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. This contention
is without merit, ignoring both the law and his own admissions before the court. A BAC of
.08% is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not defendant was under the influence
of alcohol. The automobile homicide statute to which defendant pleaded guilty requires a
showing that defendant operated a motor vehicle either while having a BAC of at least .08%
or while under the influence of alcohol and/or any drug to a degree that rendered him
incapable of safely operating the vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1 )(a) (1995).
Defendant's plea of guilty to automobile homicide is an admission of each element of the
offense. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(a) (1998); James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573 (Utah
App. 1998) (observing that "a guilty plea is in effect an admission not only that the defendant
did certain acts, but also that the defendant committed a certain crime"). Accordingly,
because defendant's BAC was under .08%, his plea of guilty constitutes an admission that
he operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree that
rendered him incapable of safely operating the vehicle. Although defendant denied the effect
of marijuana on his driving, defendant fully admitted in the Statement of Defendant that his
"driving was impacted by the fact [he] was under the influence of alcohol." R. 28. Whether
defendant's intoxication was from the alcohol, the marijuana, or a combination of the two,
15

is irrelevant. Given defendant's own admissions, the court's consideration in sentencing that
defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana prior to the accident was expedient and
well within its discretion.
2.

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's History.

Defendant's Criminal History. Defendant also claims that the trial court misconstrued
and put undue weight on his criminal history. Again, however, the record does not support
this contention. Defendant equates this case with Galli, in which the supreme court vacated
the consecutive sentences in part because Galli's criminal history included only minor traffic
offenses and one misdemeanor theft conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 15. As explained above,
however, Galli is distinguishable from this case because Galli did not cause the deaths of
anyone nor did he even injure anyone. The cases are also distinguishable because, contrary
to defendant's contention, his criminal history is not as minor as it would have the court
believe. Although the PSI did not report any felony convictions, it did indicate that
defendant had been convicted for: (1) resisting arrest on two occasions, (2) misdemeanor
battery or similar offenses on four occasions,13 one of which involved serious bodily injury,
(3) vandalism, and (4) possession of a controlled substance. PSI at 9-10. These crimes,
although misdemeanors, are not mere traffic offenses as was the case in Galli.
Noting that none of defendant's prior crimes were for reckless driving or were
otherwise alcohol-related offenses, defendant takes issue with the court's conclusion that his

13

One of the four convictions was identified as a misdemeanor conviction for
inflicting corporal injury. PSI at 10.
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prior conduct should have taught him better. Aplt. Brf. at 14-16. Although the reported
convictions do not indicate a history of reckless driving, the statute does not limit the court's
consideration to only those offenses which resemble the crime for which he is being
sentenced. The trial court may properly consider the overall criminal history of defendant.
See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 548 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that in light of the
defendant's extensive criminal history, "the trial court did not err in failing to recognize
defendant's lack of history of similar sex-related offenses as a mitigating factor"). Moreover,
although the offenses for which he was convicted did not involve reckless driving, the
battery-related offenses do demonstrate a general disregard for the life or well-being of
others. This disregard resulted in five deaths on July 24, 1997.14
Defendant's History of Substance Abuse. Defendant also claims that because he had
never been convicted of an alcohol-related crime, the court committed reversible error when
it stated that both defendant and Akauola "had been arrested, convicted and sentenced for
drinking crimes and drug crimes." TOS at 24. However, defendant did not apprise the trial
court of the inaccuracy or otherwise raise the issue either at the time the trial court made the

14

In addition to these convictions, the record also reported arrests for battery on
two other occasions and for a hit and run offense, the dispositions of which were not
available. PSI at 9-10. See State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1981) (holding that
the sentencing judge may consider evidence of crimes for which the defendant has been
charged, tried, and acquitted as well as for crimes for which the defendant has been
charged but not tried); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding
that "other criminal conduct may properly be considered, even though the defendant was
never charged with it or convicted of it"); cf. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah
1986) (observing that the "[defendant's view that the trial judge was unduly influenced
by defendant's arrest record is purely speculative").
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misstatement or in his Motion to Correct Sentence. R. 51-53. Accordingly, defendant failed
to preserve the issue and he is now foreclosed from raising the matter for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[a] defendant
is obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an
appellate court"); see also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Utah 1980) (noting that a
defendant is permitted to know the substance of a presentence report in order to provide him
with an opportunity "to prevent a court from proceeding on inaccuracies").
Even had the issue been preserved for appeal, the challenged statement, when viewed
in light of the court's entire remarks at sentencing, was simply an observation that both
defendants had committed substance abuse crimes. No particular emphasis was placed on
either type of offense and it appears that the court viewed the two types of offenses as
indistinguishable. Although the court may have articulated its thoughts more carefully, it at
all times acknowledged that defendant's record was not as serious as that of Akauola.15 For
example, before defense counsel addressed the court regarding Akauola's sentencing, the
court observed that "Akauola's record is significantly worse than Mr. Katoa's." TOS at 11.
When it sentenced defendant, the court noted that defendant "is not as evil as some of the
people [] see[n] [] in court" and recognized that Akauola's "record shows much more serious
criminal activity in the past," including a prior "incident [for reckless driving] where
15

Akauola's adult criminal record included convictions for disturbing the peace,
two misdemeanor assault charges, attempted burglary (a class A misdemeanor), carrying
a concealed weapon, possession of paraphernalia, receiving stolen property, taking a
vehicle without consent, petty theft, vandalism, reckless driving, leaving the scene of an
accident, and driving under the influence. PSI-Akauola at 10-11.
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[Akauola] w[as] lucky [he] didn't kill anybody." TOS at 23. Directly following the
statement challenged by defendant, the court said, "I do see a difference in prior record and
conduct. I see Mr. Akauola as more culpable but not sufficiently more culpable to get a
different sentence."16 TOS at 24.
In any case, the PSI included other evidence, unchallenged by defendant, that
supported the court's concern regarding defendant's past substance abuse.17 The PSI
indicated that defendant, who was 30 at the time of sentencing, began using marijuana at the
I
age of 21. PSI at 1,15. Defendant had occasionally used marijuana since that time and even
tried crystal methamphetamine and cocaine. PSI at 15. The PSI also suggests that defendant
did not exercise good judgment after consuming alcohol. Defendant began drinking alcohol
at the age of 16 or 17 and his drinking became much heavier when he moved to Utah. PSI
at 14. The PSI reports that defendant seldom drank heavily on weekdays. PSI at 14.
However, defendant reported that he customarily went to a bar at least one weekend night
each week and %'would leave pretty intoxicated but still able to drive home/' PSI at 14. In
light of the foregoing additional information, which was also before the trial court, any
misstatement that defendant had been convicted of an alcohol-related offense was harmless
at worst.
16

Given the context under which this follow-up comment was made, the trial
court's reference to the culpability of the defendants does not appear to be to their
comparative fault for the accident, but rather to the seriousness of their criminal histories.
17

Defendant did not challenge any information set forth in the PSI. TOS at 1. See
Lipsky, 639 P.2d at 175 (presentence report provided to the defendant to provide him an
opportunity to bring to the court's attention any inaccuracies).
19

3.

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Character,

Defendant also contends that the court did not give adequate consideration to certain
factors regarding his character. Aplt. Brf. at 17. Again, however, defendant's contention is
not supported by the record. Specifically addressing defendant's character, the court stated
that defendant was clearly "not as evil as some of the people [] see[n] [] in court." TOS at
23. Defendant acknowledges that the court credited him for "behav[ing] responsibly and
appropriately" since the accident. TOS at 23. He also concedes that the court viewed
defendant's remorse as "very sincere," concluding that defendant "obviously care[d] deeply."
TOS at 23. Nevertheless, defendant contends that the court failed to give adequate
consideration to "other" factors regarding his character. Aplt. Brf at 17.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court not only considered those "other"
factors, but clearly relied on them in reaching its conclusion that defendant was remorseful
and behaved responsibly since the accident. The fact that defendant expressed to the victims
his remorse and offered to participate in mediation supports the court's conclusion that
defendant was remorseful. Likewise, defendant's seeming acceptance of responsibility,
including the offer to pay restitution, his efforts to provide for the future needs of his family,
and his voluntary return from California, support the court's conclusion that he had behaved
responsibly since the accident.18 Moreover, that defendant had not been in the criminal
18

Defendant contends that he cooperated with the investigation and admitted his
involvement. Aplt. Brf. at 17. However, this claim is not entirely supported by the
record. The investigating officer assigned to the accident reported that "neither
[defendant nor Akauola] has been totally cooperative during the investigation," both only
admitting to what was already known and "shifting] as much responsibility as possible
20

system since 1995 and had a fairly consistent work history since 1991 supported the court's
conclusion that he was clearly not "as evil" as others who came through the criminal system.
Had the court not considered these factors, it could not have reached the conclusions it did
regarding defendant's character.
4.

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Rehabilitative
Needs.

Rehabilitation is among the legitimate purposes of incarceration, and, accordingly, a
factor to be considered by the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). The court
manifested its skepticism regarding defendant's prospect for rehabilitation when it indicated
that defendant's prior record should have taught him better. TOS at 23. The court further
manifested this skepticism when it sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms.
However, recognizing the Board of Pardons' role in monitoring a prisoner's progress, the
court stated, %'It will be up to the Board of Pardons to determine when you are out." TOS at
24.
Defendant argues that the consecutive sentences are not in accordance with his
rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Brf. at 18. In support of this contention, defendant argues that
neither the PSI nor the court suggested that he was a continuing threat to society or that his
prospects for rehabilitation were unfavorable. Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. Defendant's argument
essentially rests on the premise that a trial court abuses its discretion unless it imposes a
sentence that accords controlling weight to the defendant's rehabilitative needs. Such a

from themselves." PSI at 9.
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premise is not supported by case law. The supreme court has unequivocally stated that
"[incarceration may be for purposes other than rehabilitation." State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d
261, 268 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993).
Defendant relies heavily on Strunk, Smith, and Galli for his contention that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. However, the underlying facts
and rationale that led to the reversal of consecutive sentences in these cases are not
applicable to this case.
In Strunk, the defendant pled guilty to three first degree felonies: murder, child
kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The court sentenced the defendant to
life imprisonment on the murder charge, a minimum mandatory term of fifteen years to life
for child kidnapping, and a minimum mandatory term of nine years to life for aggravated
sexual abuse of a child. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1298. The court ordered that the sentences run
consecutively, which would result in defendant's incarceration for at least 24 years. The
supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion in running the sentences
consecutively, finding that it had "fail[ed] to sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative
needs in light of his extreme youth19 and the absence of prior violent crimes." Id. at 1302.
The Court reasoned that "[w]hile imprisonment for that period of time, or even longer, may
prove to be necessary and appropriate, the twenty-four year term robs the Board of Pardons
of any flexibility to parole [the defendant] sooner." Id. at 1301. The court concluded that

19

Strunk was 16 years old at the time he committed the crimes. Strunk, 846 P.2d at

1298.
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a concurrent sentence was warranted under the circumstances of the case so as "to afford the
Board of Pardons the flexibility to adjust [the defendant's] prison stay to match his progress
in rehabilitation and preparation to return to society." Id. at 1302.
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of four first degree felonies: aggravated
kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of sodomy on a child. 909 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah
1995). The trial court sentenced the defendant to a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen
years to life on each count and ordered that they run consecutively. Id. The supreme court
concluded that requiring the defendant to serve no less than 60 years in prison was
"tantamount to a minimum mandatory life sentence," a sentence the legislature had reserved
only for crimes of capital murder. Id. at 244-45. Observing that the "Board [of Pardons] is
in a far better position than a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and
possible progress toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence
accordingly," the supreme court concluded that the consecutive sentences improperly
divested the Board of its "discretion to release defendant, irrespective of his progress, until
sixty years have elapsed." Id. at 244.
In Galli, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to three charges of aggravated robbery.
Galli, 967 P.2d at 931. The respective trial courts each sentenced the defendant to serve an
indeterminate term of five years to life. Id. at 932-33. The last two courts to sentence the
defendant ordered that the sentence be served consecutively with the others.

Id.

Accordingly, pursuant to the sentences, the defendant would be required to serve at least 15
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years in prison.20 The supreme court overturned the consecutive sentences, finding that the
trial courts failed to give adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938.
Again, as in Strunk and Smith, the supreme court in Galli concluded that a concurrent
sentence "would better serve[] [the defendant's] rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board
of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he has shown genuine
progress toward rehabilitation." Id.
Unlike the sentences in Strunk, Smith, and Galli, the consecutive prison terms in this
case do not rob the Board of Pardons of its discretion to adjust the actual time defendant
serves in prison. Although the judgment ordering consecutive prison terms increases the
maximum possible term from five years to ten years, it does not in any way divest the Board
of its discretion to release defendant early if his progress so warrants. Whether the resulting
sentence is zero-to-five years or zero-to-ten years, the Board can grant as early a release as
it deems appropriate. Indeed, the consecutive terms imposed by the trial court afford the
Board with even greater latitude, allowing it to extend defendant's stay should his progress,
or lack thereof, so dictate. In short, defendant's sentence does not pose the same concerns
that were expressed by the supreme court in Strunk, Smith, and Galli. Defendant does not
20

Even though Galli's sentences of five years to life were ordered to run
consecutively, the actual number of years Galli would be required to serve still would
have been left to the Board of Pardons because they were indeterminate sentences. See
Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that "the number of
years a defendant will serve under an indeterminate sentence i s left to the unfettered
discretion of the board of pardons'") (quoting Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and
Parole, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991)). However, because the supreme court in Galli
treated the sentences as minimum mandatory sentences, so too will the State for purposes
of argument only.
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face a minimum term of 60 years, 24 years, or even 15 years. Indeed, although defendant's
conduct resulted in five deaths (unlike Strunk, Smith, or Galli), he does not even face a
maximum term of 15 years.21
C.

Defendant's Claim that the Consecutive Prison Terms Violated the
Unnecessary Rigor Clause of the Utah Constitution is Without Merit.

Lastly, defendant argues that the consecutive terms violate his right against ''unduly
rigorous punishment" under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 5,20.
This argument is without merit for three reasons. First, defendant failed to preserve this
claim either at sentencing or in his Motion to Correct Sentence. See TOS at 1-24; R. 51-53.
Having failed to raise the issue before the trial court, the appellate court will not now address
defendant's constitutional claim on appeal. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654-55 n. 3. Second,
defendant makes only vague references in his brief, without argument, to the constitutional
provision. On the first page of his argument, defendant simply cites to section 9 in support
of his claim that the consecutive sentences are "excessive and unfair in light of the
circumstances of [defendant's] case." Aplt. Brf. at 5. The only other reference to the
"unnecessary rigor" clause is on the last page of defendant's brief wherein he makes the
conclusory statement that the consecutive sentences amount to "an unduly rigorous
punishment in violation of [defendant's] right under Article I, section 9 of the Utah
Constitution." Aplt. Brf. at 20. Because defendant "fails to establish how the protections of
the unnecessary rigor clause apply to the facts of his case," this Court will not address the
21

Nor is defendant particularly young, a major factor upon which the supreme
court in Strunk relied in vacating the consecutive terms. See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1302.
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argument. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654. Finally, although the full scope of the clause has not
been articulated, the plain language of the clause "appl[ies] to the treatment of imprisoned
persons and not to the terms of punishment." Id. (citing State v. M.L.C., 933 P.2d 380, 385
(Utah 1997);Bottv.DeLand,922?.2d7329737(UtBh

1996)). Therefore, defendant's claim

that the sentence violated the unnecessary rigor clause is not properly before this Court, and,
in any event, is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Given the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, and in light of the character,
history, and rehabilitative needs of defendant, which factors were duly considered by the trial
court, it cannot be said that the court's imposition of consecutive prison terms is a sentence
that no reasonable person would impose. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. As such, the trial court
acted within its discretion and the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial
court's sentence.
Respectfully submitted this rlv\^ day of August, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
KATOA, ALFRED P.

PLEA BARGAIN:
The defendant was initially charged with Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Second Degree
Felony, five counts. By negotiation he pled guilty to Automobile Homicide, Third Degree
Felony, two counts.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake District Attorney's file
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE:
On July 24, 1997 at approximately 3:00 pm, West Valley Police were informed of a multi-car
accident at 4252 West 3100 South. The first officers on the scene found three cars and a
parked flatbed truck involved with numerous injuries and several obvious fatalities. Additional
emergency personnel were called in with dozens of police, fire and medical staff eventually
participating. Injured parties were removed from the vehicles, several requiring sophisticated
extraction procedures due to the mangled condition of the cars. Life Flight, Airmed and
numerous ambulances were used in transporting the injured to various hospitals for treatment.
Once all steps possible had been taken to treat the victims, officers began to piece together
the facts which led to the accident, using the statements of witnesses at the scene, injured
parties from the vehicles and physical evidence gathered at the scene.
It was learned that a large group of Pacific Islanders had gathered earlier this date at Granger
High School for a rugby tournament. A black Jeep on which an attempt to locate as a possible
DUI was located amongst the vehicles in the Granger High School parking lot. A number of
individuals were around the jeep, but nobody inside. Officers spoke with the individuals in the
area and dumped out several beer cans, reportedly stating that consuming alcohol on those
premises was not allowed.
Some time later, two vehicles, a van and the black Jeep, left, reportedly to go to a private
home for something to eat. Six individuals were in the van and four in the Jeep. Traveling
westbound on 3100 South at a high rate of speed, the van pulled left of center, apparently to
pass the Jeep. The Jeep sped up and/or swerved into the van to prevent it from passing. The
van then lost control and collided with an eastbound Toyota containing two individuals. The
van then continued a short distance to where it collided with a flatbed trailer. The Jeep then
lost control and collided into the undercarriage of the truck trailer.
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OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: (continued)
Killed instantly in the eastbound Toyota was Helene Sherlin, who was driving the vehicle.
According to police reports, "It appeared that half of her head, face and throat had been torn
away by the impact of the accident." Later attempts to retrieve a blood sample from Mrs.
Sherlin proved futile, as an adequate sample could not be found in her body, even in the
chambers of her heart. Robert Sherlin also received massive injuries, but was cut from the
Toyota and rushed to the hospital. He died six days later of his injuries.
Also dead at the scene from massive injuries were Sione Pilivi and Selanito Sitani, passengers
in the van. Other van occupants injured and transported to various hospitals were Amanaki
Moala, Kivalu Moa, Lamu Tongamana and Fred Katoa. Amanaki Moala later died of his
injuries. Investigation showed Fred Katoa to have been the driver of the van.
Occupants of the Jeep injured and transported to the hospital were Aisea Akauola, Sosiua
Taufa and Samani Sekona. Mr. Akauola was identified as the driver of the Jeep. A fourth
occupant, Andrew Kaufusi was injured, but seen running from the crash site. Two days later,
he was interviewed by officers, who found him to be the least injured of all victims, suffering
only from "major road rash". He, among other survivors, provided statements for officers.
Blood samples were taken from Mr. Katoa and Mr. Akauola. Mr. Katoa showed Blood Alcohol
of .02 with "metabolite for marijuana with non quantitative results." Mr. Akauola tested Blood
Alcohol of .11, also with "metabolite for marijuana with non quantitative results."
Accident ^constructionist discovered fresh rubber tire markings on the right side of the van
and three separate contact areas, suggesting contact between the van and Jeep prior to
collision. They also determined, basedon tire scuff marks on the road, that the Jeep and Van
were traveling between approximately 79^81 mph at the time of the collision.
On August 6, 1997, an interview was held with Fred Katoa. He admitted smoking two "joints"
of marijuana at the park prior to the accident, as wallas drinking four beers. Tie recalled^
someone asking him to move out of the driver's seat due to his level of intoxication, but drove
anyway. He stated he could not identify everyone in the van with him and stated he could not
recall any part of the accident.
On August 14, 1997, Officers searched a trailer full of miscellaneous debris from me accident
scene, locating a blue bag containing drug paraphernalia, including: a 4" pipe, a T pipe, and
hand scales. Also in the bag was a pay stub for Fred Katoa.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
West Valley City Police Case #97-41881
DEFENDANTS VERSION OF OFFENSE:
"It started Wednesday morning. I went to the rugby field with Amanaki and some other
friends. We stayed there for a long while. I had drank some beer. A Policeman had come
over to us and had us leave the park. We left the park and were going to a friend's house. As
we were going Isaiah past me and cut in front of me. I then pulled forward into the median
and got back along side of him. I then remember the jeep hitting the side of the van.
There is nothing in this world that could of prepared me for the day that I woke up in the
hospital and for the realization of what had happened. I can not in my heart and soul ever
make it up to the people that lost there lives in this situation. I could not even begin to ask for
forgiveness from there families because the lost being so great I would like for them to know
that I wished that I could change things and that I did not even want or try to do this
intentionally. If I could change places with any one of the victims I would. I know that nothing
I do could make up for what has happened but I will never stop trying."
7-6-98

/s/ Alfred Katoa

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant's handwritten statement
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS:
Aisea Akauola pled guilty to identical counts on the same date as Mr. Akauola. He is also
scheduled for sentencing on June 29,1998.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Third District Court records

PAGE 5
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
KATOA, ALFRED P.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT:
Victim Impact Statements have been completed and returned by Robert and William Sherlin
and Carol Pillard, the children of Bob and Helene Sherlin. Each asks the Court to impose the
maximum sentence allowed by law in this case. Each of them, plus the other following family
members who have written letters, ask that they be attached to this report and reviewed by the
Court: Wayne Pillard, Peggy Sherlin, Sara Sherlin, Sheila Lebato, Carolyn Royal, Mary
Elizabeth Densly and Carol Snyder. In addition, other, non-family members, have asked that
their letters be attached and reviewed by the Court. They are: Dale and Ruth Acord, Shirley
Rossy, Harry Fenuemo, Anna McEwen, Bob and Kathy Behoend, F.F. Carbone, Steven
Patey, Laurel Casados, Patti Thomas, Charlotte Boardman, Rebecca Patrick and Paula Kertz.
The following family members of Sione Pilivi and Moala Amanaki have also written letters
expressing their grief and loss over the death of these individuals: Sione and Foakautu'u Pilivi,
Veisinia Mo'ungaafi (on behalf of several others as noted in the letter), Falanisis Pilivi and
family, Sione Kauvaka and Sosefina Pilivi and Dianna Pilivi. Other family member attending a
family gathering in California may submit additional letters directly to the Court upon their
return.
The Salt Lake District Attorney's Office has reported they have been unsuccessful in
maintaining contact with the family of the fifth fatality, Selanito Sitani. Correspondence sent to
the listed family members has gone unanswered. This writer's calls to the telephone numbers
available from the police reports and from the Victim/Witness caseworkers assigned to this
case show them to no longer be assigned to any members of this victim's family. No input is,
therefore, available from this family.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Victims as listed above.
RESTITUTION:
VICTIM
^Moal^Amanaki

STATUS

CONTACT

RESTITUTION

Deceased

Spoke to family members and
encouraged them to submit all
bills to Victim Reparations

Victim Reparations
Case #109286
Amount paid to date:
$27,688.59
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Robert Sherlin

Deceased

Family members report
medical and funeral expenses
have been covered by various
insurance companies. They
have been encouraged to
submit any additional
expenses to Victims
Reparations.

Victim Reparations
Case#109416.
Nothing paid to date
because family has
not yet submitted
request.

Helene Sherlin

Deceased

Family members report
medical and funeral expenses
have been covered by various
insurance companies. They
have been encouraged to
submit any additional
expenses to Victims
Reparations.

Victim Reparations
Case#109283
Nothing paid to date
because family has
not yet submitted
request.

Sione Pilivi

Deceased

Spoke to Family and referred
them to Victims Reparation, as
they indicate the subject's
medical and funeral expenses
remain outstanding.

No information
available from family,
but they have agreed
to open a case with
Victim Reparation
and submit all
expenses.

Selanito Sitani

Deceased

No contact possible, see above

Expenses unknown.

Lamu Tongamana

Recovering

Family reports head & back
injuries from which he has not
yet fully recovered. Light
headed and dizzy still and
unable to work. Mentally "not
all with i f and may never fully
recover. Referred to Victim
Reparation and invited to write
letter, which has not been
received.

Approximately
$14,000 in medical
expenses to date,
plus ongoing
treatment. Referred
to Victim Reparation
to open case.
Family promised to
follow through.
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Kivalu Moa

Recovering

Family reports he received
head, back, leg and arm
injuries. Physically okay now,
but "forgets a lot of things."
Able to work again. Family
invited to write letters to Court,
but none received to date.

Approximately
$7,000 in medical
expenses to date,
plus ongoing
treatment. Referred
to Victim Reparation
to open case.
Family promised to
follow through

Sosiua Taufa

Unknown

Contact attempted, but
unsuccessful with "Uncle Finu"
with whom he reportedly lives
in Fontana, California.

No case yet opened
with Victim
Reparations and no
other information is
available.

Andrew Kaufusi

Recovering

Several unsuccessful attempts
to contact at family home in
West Jordan and one message
left with unnamed family
member. Message not
returned and no further answer
at that number.

No case yet opened
with Victim
Reparations,
although he has
been instructed by
the VictimA/Vitness
Program to submit all
expenses there.

Samani Sekona

Recovered

Cousin "Andrew" and
Family members in California
report he is fully recovered and 1 unnamed adult
feeling well. They refuse,
| family member
though to answer any other
indicate they don't
questions, giving conflicting
know what his
statements as to where he is
expenses might be
currently living.
and refused to copy
the phone numbers
of Victim Reparation
or this writer.
J

^—•

6°
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RESTITUTION: (continued)
Of all of the victims contacted to date, none are prepared to make a specific claim for
restitution. All are referred to the Office of Crime Victim Reparations and it is suggested
restitution be ordered as determined by that agency, subject to hearing, if the defendants so
request.
The insurance carrier for SMP Inc., owners of the flatbed trailer, has filed separate suit against
the defendants to recoup their losses in this accident. As per the current practice of AP&P,
this claim is not included in the above figures.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Victims as listed above
CUSTODY STATUS:
The subject was initially arrested on this offense September 4, 1997 and remained
incarcerated until November 7, 1997. As of the date of sentencing, he will have been in
custody a total of 64 days.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Salt Lake County Jail records
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT:
Detective Arman Casanova, West Valley Police Department, was assigned as the
investigating officer following this incident. He states, "In twenty-four years of law
enforcement, I've never seen anything that would equal this. The degree of damage to the
vehicles, the physical trauma to the bodies of the deceased and the extent of injuries to the
survivors clearly demonstrate the speed of the defendant's vehicles. Others can debate over
which vehicle turned into the other first; was one vehicle actually just trying to pass and the
other not allowing them to do so; were they actually racing or just messing around, etc."
Detective Casanova believes none of this really matters. It is clear both drivers were acting
with total disregard for the safety of themselves and others and both must be held totally
accountable for the horrendous outcome.
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LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: (continued)
Detective Casanova expresses the opinion that, although both defendants seem remorseful at
present and may be basically good individuals, neither has been totally cooperative during the
investigation of this case. Both admitted only to those things which were already known and
.attempted to shift as much responsibility as possible away from themselves. Neither of the
defendant's vehicle was covered by liability insurance and neither of them are prepared to
cover the expense resulting from this accident. He believes the defendants have already
received all consideration they might deserve in this matter by the reduction in the charges
against them and suggests consecutive sentencing is in order.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Detective Arman Casanova, Investigating Officer
JUVENILE RECORD:
Mr. Katoa denies having a juvenile violation history in California and records show he does not
have one in Utah. Considering his adult record, this is surprising, causing the subject to
voluntarily explain, "I didn't start drinking until I was eighteen and that's when I started getting
into trouble."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant and Utah State Juvenile Court
ADULT RECORD:
DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

4-14-89

CAMC-Ontario, CA Obst/Resist P.O.

Convicted Misd-Probation

6-25-89

SO-San Bern, CA

Battery w/Serious Bodily
Injury

Convicted Misd-Jail

9-27-89

SO-San Bern, CA

Hit & Run-Prop Damage
Obst/Resist P.O.

Not reported
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ADULT RECORD:(continued)
DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

11-9-90

SO-San Bern, CA

Assault Deadly Weapon
Burglary, 1st Deg
Vandalism

Dismissed
Dismissed
Convicted Misd-180 days & Prob

2-27-91

PD-SoSLC, UT

Cont Del Minor

Unknown

4-18-91

PD-WVC, UT

Assault on P.O.
Resisting Arrest
Trespassing

Dismissed (Warrant not served)

4-5-93

SO-San Bern, CA

Obst/Resist P.O
Battery

Convicted Misd-Prob/Jail

4-14-94
count

SO-San Bern, CA

Battery, 2 counts

Convicted Misd Battery one
Prob/Jail

6-18-94

SO-San Bern, CA

Battery

Not reported

9-14-94

SO-San Bern, CA

Battery

Not reported

9-20-95

SO-San Bern, CA

Transp Cont Sub
Poss Cont Sub for Sale
Inflict Corp Inj Cohab
Battery
Vandalism

Convicted Inflict Corporal InjMisd; Poss Cont Sub-Misd;
Battery-Misd, Probation/Jail

9-4-97

PD-SVC, UT

Criminal Homicide

CURRENT OFFENSE

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
UBCI SID#345960, FBI# 737801TA6 & Third District Court records
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DRIVING HISTORY:
No citations found.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
Utah DLD#151847210
PENDING CASES:
There are no known pending cases against this defendant.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
UBC

r

~'if^45PR0,l rR'£ 7 '>''Pf , < T » r <- ' - - '

-

•

PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY:
Mr. Katoa has been on what he describes as informal, Court probatiu . nuns!-.. .
California, but never has been on probation supervision of any kind in ' itah.

__ n

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, UBCISID#345bL. . „ .
Probation and Parole records

„,

,

. .

BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION:
Alfred Katoa was born on February 18, 1968 in Tonga, the twelfth of thirteen children of Viliam
and Lesieli Katoa. At the age of four, the subject came with his parents and several of the
other children to the U. S., living with an uncle in Coocamonga, California for a couple of
years, while saving to buy their own home in Etiwanda, California. There, his father worked as
a machine operator, usually working two full-time jobs, allowing his mother to remain in the
home as a housewife. The family maintained a lower middle-class lifestyle. At the age of
sixteen, the subject completed the process to become a naturalized citizen of the U.S.
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BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: (continued)
Mr. Katoa reports a close, loving, supportive relationship with all family members, immediate
and extended. He reports no serious abuse or other problems, although he states when ;
necessary, his father did not hesitate to punish him for wrongdoing. He remained in their
home, taking over primary support of his parents as his father became more aged. In 1996,
his father passed away and the subject quick claimed the family home, which was in his name,
to his sister, as she wished to accept primary responsibility for caring for their mother. He
states he is still in very close contact with his mother and all siblings.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
MARITAL HISTORY:
The subject has never married, but he has been involved in a relationship for almost ten years
with Christie Olden. Together, they have had three children: Justin, 6 yrs old; Saia, age 5 and
Epenisa, fours years old. She is expecting a fourth child which is due in August, but current
plans are for the defendant's sister to adopt the child, which "in my culture is quite acceptable
since my sister can't have any kids and it only makes me love her more that she is willing to do
this and fit into the family the way she is." The defendant and Ms Olden have been separated
on several occasions for up to three months, but always reunite. He indicates that while he is
incarcerated for the current offenses, she intends to return to California, where she will live
with the children in the subject's mother's home. He believes that with the support of his
family, Christie and the children will be fine while he is away, although he writes, ul will have to
try to make it up to them. The time that I will lose I don't think I will be able to make up
because of their ages. I will miss them growing up and for that I am truly sorry."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
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EDUCATION:
The subject attended public schools in California, achieving average grades and having no
serious problems until his junior year. He explains, "I got into a fight with three Mexican
gentlemen who jumped me. We all got expelled. Then they let me back in to play football for
my senior year, then got kicked out again for another fight
Later, after coming to Utah, the subject tried to return to finish school at West Jordan High
School, but after a couple of months, he was offered a job where he could make some very
good money to try and support his family, so he quit and has never gone back. He hopes to
be able to finish school in the next few months, while incarcerated.
SOURCE OF

|NF0RMAT|QN:

The defendant, Christie OIIIIPII riirlfin im! ami Ni'n-i PHIIHI.I

GANG AFFILIATIONS:

isfer

I

The
~;ates, "When you're in California and are I ongan, the police will always label you
a Tc
»np. In reality, I when I was young, I was caught up in it a little and the truth was
you
had to hang with the group or you hung alone and that was dangerous. So I guess I
was in a gang, although I didn't get in all that much trouble with them and never considered
myself a gang member."
\
Local records do not show the defendant as being actively involved in gang activities in Utah
and he states escaping the gang environment was one of the major reasons he wanted to
move to Salt Lake
SOUKUb

I:

The defendant and Salt Lake Area Gang Project recbrds.
PHYSICAL HEALTH:
1 he defendant has always enjoyed relatively good physical health and has never suffered any
serious illnesses, injuries or accidents until the current offense occurred. During the wreck,
both of his lungs were collapsed, both shoulders and his right scapula were broken, his right
leg was shattered and considerable rebuilding was necessary His right ear was almost
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PHYSICAL HEALTH:(continued)
completely cut off. He has somewhat recovered, but is no longer able to participate in sports
or heavy physical labor. He currently takes no prescription medications.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
MENTAL HEALTH:
Mr. Katoa has never undergone any form of mental health evaluation or treatment and feels
that until the current offense, he had a positive attitude toward life. Since this incident, he has
struggled with overwhelming remorse and depression as he asks why he allowed this to
happen. He states, "I can never make it up to the people I did this too, both those that I never
had a chance to know and my close friends. There is now way I can ever fix that. I just have
to live with it someway. The other day I saw one of my friend's kids and I can just can't
believe that I took something from that I can never replace, their father."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
ALCOHOL HISTORY:
The subject first began to use alcohol at the age of sixteen or seventeen. As he came to Utah
at the age of eighteen, his drinking became much heavier, although seldom did he drink
heavily on weekdays when he was working, but only on the weekends. He reported he would
generally go to the bar with a brother or friend at least one weekend night per week and
"would leave pretty intoxicated but still able to drive home." Despite this pattern, he had no
DUI arrests and apparently felt a certain comfort level driving after several drinks, as occurred
on the occasion of the current offense, when he consumed approximately four beers before
driving away from the park. He states, "My memory of that day is not clear, but I don't
remember being drunk, but I knew I'd had a few over a period of time."
Since this incident, the subject has drank a few times, but always at home or at a friend's,
don't go out any more. I definitely don't drive any more when I've had anything to drink.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The Hi'faniliinl, nimsln n|i| iini, i|iillii ml iiiiiiil Mir'.H Primiii, "iirslni

DRUG HISTORY:
j l i e s u | } j e C | | } e g a n | Q u s e m a r j j u a n a a | |he age of about twenty-one. He used this occasionally
for years, then eventually tried crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, but did not enjoy either
of these substances. He says, "I would never buy marijuana, but if somebody ever offered
me some, I would share it with them," This continued until the day of this offense, "When I
believe I smoked some earlier in the day when somebody gave me some, but I don't
remember getting high Tl lei • 3 were a lot of us sharing it, so I probable only got about three
hits on it that day."
Since the accident, the si ib ject has not used any marijuana or any other substance.
S Q U R C E

Q F

| N F 0 R M A T | Q N :

Thede^-- 1 —' ••>—*- ~ , J —

r

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
The d ill end am I s bum uiillll .m 1 111111 III, lliiinlier is bLiU III Li.1 I

EMPLOYER

WAGE

TITLE

START/END

FOR LEAVING

T & J Concrete

$354 wonk

finisher

12-97 to present

Currently employed

$11firihi

linnhfi

1996 to 7-97

MOIIIII

mi StatPS

Upland Ro
& Grill

r $10.00

SeaGate Maqru tn

T i l Mil In

hlnn|iii

1993 to 1995

Moved

1991 to 1993

Wenttojail

in

When not employed elsewhere, the subject works with his brothers who work as handymen,
doing construction, remodeling, landscaping, etc.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
FINANCIAL SITUATION:
Currently, the subject earns about $1600 a month. He pays rent of $500 a month, plus utilities
of $130 a month. He states his only debt is $20,000 in restitution in California for a vandalism
case where he is being held accountable for the entire amount, as his two co-defendants have
paid nothing. His current income seems adequate to meet his immediate needs, other than
this old restitution. His family is prepared, if necessary, to relocate to California if he is
incarcerated.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
MILITARY RECORD:
The defendant has never served in the military.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:
The defendant, Christie Olden, girlfriend and Nisa Pauga, sister
COLLATERAL CONTACTS:
Collateral #1: Christie Olden, girlfriend
Ms. Olden has written a letter to the Court, describing her perception of the subject's grief over
this incident and explaining what a good husband and father he is. Understanding a price
must be paid for this crime, she asks the Court for understanding and a degree of mercy for
the sake of her and their children. Her letter is attached.
Collateral #2: Nisa Pauga, sister
The defendant's sister's letter is also attached, again asking the Court to temper the
punishment required by this case for the sake of the defendant's family.
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS (contii - • I)
Collateral #3: Victoria V a s q u e z , friei n cl
Ms. V a s q u e s writes concerning the defendant's strengths and good will, • :itii ig till IIE • i : s = .ist ai : • = •
he has given her in guiding a young son through troubled times. The assui es til ie Com I: tl le
defendant has learned a great lesson already from this accident.
Collateral #4: James Strickland and Betty Fuentes, former co-workers
Both of *-t:v r^:; •

•

written letters attesting to lllllie s!ib|pft's n "mil
C h a r a C t o i c l h u c l S f \ i u y u i c w u u i i IUI I.IO.UV. Both letters are attached.
Collateral #5: John Ondrusek, former supervisor

! r
I am writing this on i>-r,r* • * Fred Kat
r ; s supervisor for a period of time while he
worked at Mountain Sta*enching in Salt Lake > } I was a friend before he worked there
also.
i

Fred was always a ve:, y-j_.. •/,.:^ ric .as on time each day, and he rarely missed a da:;; r
of work. He was like my ass stant manage:. I le was in charge m I iien I wasn't on the job site. I
felt very confident that he could handle any problem: that might ar ise
As far as a friend, he was honest and loyal, he » me kind of person that could cheer people
up, look at the bright side of things. He always anneared to be a good husband and a good
father to his kids.
When I heard of the accident, I had a great deal of remorse for the victims. I also felt sorry for
Fred too, because I know he would never hurt anyone intentionally. When I saw Fred after the
accident he expressed a lot of sorrow and remorse fir everyone involved. He told me that he
had to change his life, and that he had quit drinking. Even though he never seemed to have a
drinking problem, all it takes is one time, and I think Fred knows that better than anyone.
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued)
speaking to young people about the dangers of drinking and driving. He has a very influential
personality, maybe he could get through to someone and save some lives."
JohnOndrusek

Collateral #6: Howard Lemke, prosecutor
Mr. Lemke spoke with this writer at great length about this offense and the tremendous impact
it has had on dozens, probably hundreds, of people. He explained that one officer on the
scene remarked that on arrival he though dispatch had made a mistake and that he had been
sent to the sight of a massive explosion, because of the extent of property damage and the
condition of the dead, dying and injured. Many of the officers and medical personnel who were
involved in this incident have required counseling to deal with it. This is especially true of the
officer who asked the rugby players to leave the park when he found them drinking, not
apparently realizing the condition of the drivers.
Mr. Lemke states that in actuality, both defendants are probably reasonably nice people, and it
is obvious they were just having a good time, taking the spirit of competition from the rugby
field onto the roadway with them. Despite this, their actions were totally inexcusable and they
must face the consequences. He states the Sherlin family, understandably, insists that
maximum sentences be given to both defendants. He does not have a clear picture, though,
of the feelings of the other three families, as they have not been totally open to communication
from the police or his office. He does request that the Court carefully review the statements of
all victim's family members in deciding this case.
Collateral #7: Debra Creek-Mendez, defense counsel
The defendant's counsel also spoke with this writer, discussing many of the fine points of the
case, then submitting a letter from David Lord of Accident Reconstructionist and Cause
Analysis, challenging the original finding of investigating officers regarding the speed of the
vehicles and also reviewing information suggesting the Jeep ran into the van at some point
prior to the actual collision. While not attempting to excuse her client based on this
information, she asked that this letter be attached to this report for the court's information Ms.
Mendez further emphasizes the sincere sorrow felt by her client over his actions leading to the
deaths of these people. She knows he is prepared to pay whatever price is determined by the
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS: (continued)
Court, but adds her hope Dial sentencing i nul
defendant's family.

JU IIJI J I

lliuiil 'I Imlln i -'in linn, i

lln •

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:
Facing the Court for sentencing on two counts of Third Degree Felony ML/.
a thirty year old male who one of two drivers racing down a narrow urbar
. .. _ , _, , ;
control of their vehicles and smashed into an oncoming vehicle, then a
semi-tracer.
Five people died in the accident and others, including the defendant were seriously injured.
Neither Mr. Katoa nor his co-defendant were covered by any type of liability insurance, leaving
many tens of thousands of dollars to be paid. To date, most victims have not compiled their
final restitution requests, but all who can be contacted have been encouraged to submit their
information to the Office Of Crime Victim Reparation. Restitution to reimburse this agency for
payment of these claims is recommended.
IA/O
Mr. Katoa was born ii
nga, but came to the States at an early age
S raised primarily
in California, in a str
it loving home, but has also spent considerable time in Utah since
his mid teen years.
3t married, but has had three children with his girlfriend often
years and they are
>ectii ig a fourth child later this year. He has a good employment history
and appears to accept i E sp c i isifc iillliit; for his family. Conversely over the past ten, years, the
defendant has h
1 i = -\ :: i is ai i = sts, i i many appearing to be consistent with his self-report of
association with gang m e m b e r s j n California. He also admits heavy alcohol use and some use
of controlled substances, both of which contributed to the current offense. It is of concern that
the defendant admittedly has continued to drink.

It would appear Mr. Katoa is truly sorry for his involvement in the current offense. He also
understands that the Court must hold him accountable for this crime. He does have the
support of a family who seems prepared to deal; with the consequences of this offense.
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:(continued)
Nonetheless given the horrendous nature of this crime and loss suffered by so many Mr Kafoa
must serve a substantial period of imprisonment. Hopefully, such sentence will serve not only
to deter him but others who are aware of this case, and future tragedies of this type reduced.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

GARY L. THOMPSON,
CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR
APPROVED,

0-HERINE C. SHEPHERD, AF
COURT SERVICES UNIT

AGENCY RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended by the Adult Probation and Parole Court Services Unit the
defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 years on each count, with the terms
to run consecutively. It is further recommended he be ordered to pay restitution to reimburse
the Office of Crime Victim Reparations for all claims submitted in relation to this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

GARY L. THOMPSON,
CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR
APPR'-' r r i,

Y

1

KATHERINE C. SHEPHERD, ARA
COURT SERVICES UNIT

CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS)

ft
2
4
6
8

NONE
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY
ONE
0
POOR
TWO
FAIR
12-15
THREE
MODERATE
8-11
MORE THAN THREE GOOD
4-7
EXCELLENT
0-3

PRIOR MISD. CONVICTIONS
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL INCIDENTS)
(INCLUDES DUI AND RECKLESS)
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC)

0
1
2
2
4

NONE
ONE
6
TWO TO FOUR
FIVE TO SEVEN
MORE THAN SEVEN

PRIOR JUVENILE REFERRALS
(FINDINGS OF DELINQUENT FOR
INCIDENTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN
FELONIES IF COMMITTED BY AN ADULT)
[3 NON-STATUS MISD.=FELONY]

ft
1
2
3
4

NONE
ONE
0
TWO TO FOUR
MORE THAN FOUR
SECURE PLACEMENT

SUPERVISION HISTORY
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

0

1

NO PRIOR SUPERVISION
PRIOR SUPERVISION
PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT
PRIOR REVOCATION
CURRENT SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE

2
3
4
SUPERVISION RISK
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

2
1
2
3

16-28

PLEASE CIRCLE THE
CORRECT CATEGORY

NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFF.) OR OUTSTANDINGWARRANT
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROG. OR EXTRADITION
REQ'D
ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT

WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT
(ACTIVE OFFENSE)

NONE
"NOTE: 2nd FIREARMS
ft
OTHER
CONVICTION REQUIRES A
2
KNIFE
MANDATORY 5-10 YR
3
FIREARM OR EXPLOSIVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE*
4
TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE:
4
GENERAL DISPOSITION MATRIX
CRIME SEVERITY
MISDEMEANORS
CAPITAL
1ST DEGREE
PERSON CRIMES
OTHER CRIMES
A
B
MURII
OTHER
HOMICIDE 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 2ND DEG 3RD DEG
2ND SEX
3RD SEX
POOR

FAIR

MODER.

$10,000

$10,00
0

$10,000

$5,000

$5,000

PRISON

$5,000

$2,500

$2,500

JAIL
$1,000
$800

$10,00
0
$5,000

$5,00
0
$2,50
0

$6,000
12,500

$5,00 i $2,000
$1,500
0
$2,50

$800
$600

$2,500

$1,25
0

$600
$400

JAIL
$2,500
$2,000

$1,500
$1,000

__]

1 001 1

$10,000

$10.00

$10,000

$^.000

$5,000

p.

GOOD

$5,000

$5,000
$2,500

! Alternate . Alternate
: $5+G0D
$2,500
$1,250
! $2,500

EXCEL,

$5,000
$2,500

00
$1,250

1 $2350G
I $1350

1 Alternate!
|$245QQ 1

$10.00
0
$5,000

I $5.00

Proba

.

$1,250
$625

I JAIL

0
S2 50

JAIL
$1,000
$800

$1,000
$500

$400
$200

.

$1,250
$625

I

_ __

J Jl-IES

X

USED TO CALCULATE MINIMUM TIME IF SENTENCE IS INCARCERATION
CAPITAL 1ST DEGREE
MISDEMEANORS
MUR II OTHER

I

PERSON

10
YR3

i

(

GOOD

i

6 YRS

a

B

36
MON

2 1

2 II

i \- :: mi mi

18
I lOf I

Il 2
I I Dil II

6MOf I

r foil mi

7 YRS

5 YRS

30
MON

21
MON

21
MON

15
MON

10
MON

5 MC if J

5 YRS

4 YRS

24
MON

I! 6
MON

III!::!
MON

Il 2
MON

8 MON

- MON

« V RS

5 YRS

3 YRS

21
MON

15
MON

15
MON

| 9 M O N |

4 t 10f

" f 'ION

5 YRS

5 YRS

2 YRS

18
MON

12
MON

12
MON

6 MON

3 MON

12
MON

|6MON|

3 MON

3 V

3 MON

3 MON

3K

\

1

0 1 Il HEIR CRIMES

HOMICIDE 2ND DEG 3RD DEG 2ND DEG 3RD DEG
2ND SEX 3RD SEX

TRS

*

CRJ1 IES

3 MON

CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS
36
MON

L .

30
MON

24
MON

18
MON

12
MON

CONCURR ENT ENHANCEMENTS ADDED BY B.O.P
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SEN FENCES SHOULD GENERALLY BE CONCURRENT. HOWEVER, THfe EXISTENCE OF THE FOLLOWING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES:

gjlj

[

1.
ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE
2.
UNDER SUPERVISION OR BAIL RELEASE WHEN OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
3.
UNUSUAL VICTIM VULNERABILITY
4.
INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS EXTREME FOR CRIME CATEGORY
5.
OFFENSE CHARACTERIZED BY EXTREME CRUELTY OR DEPRAVITY
IF THE SENTENCES ARE TO BE CONSECUTIVE, USE THE CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS PORTION OF THE
TIME MATRIX" FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE "MOST SERIOUS" CONVICTION.

FORM4

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations)
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the guidelines. Reference
the page number of the presentence investigation where the judge can find supportive
information.
Aggravating Circumstances
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction offense or the
calculation of criminal history score.
PSIPage#
9-10 1.
2.
3.
2-3 4.
5.
2-3 6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

_ 1.
. 2.
3.
_ 4.
_ 5.
_ 6.
. 7.
. 8.
m 9.
.10.
.11.
.12.

Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior.
Victim was particularly vulnerable.
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive.
Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity.
There were multiple charges or victims.
Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less restrictive setting.
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify as an high
risk offender.
Other (specify)_
Mitigating Circumstances
Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm.
Offender acted under strong provocation.
There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal behavior, though
failing to establish a defense.
Offender is young.
Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other crimes.
Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration.
Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision.
Domestic crime victim does not incarceration.
Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family
relationships.
Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents.
Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time.
Other (specify)
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GARY L THOMPSON. INC
4560 W 1975 N, OGDEN, UT 84404
PHONE (801) 731 -9189 FAX (801) 73?-

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,
i HAVE BEEN WITH FRED FOR THE LAST 9 YEARS AND HAVE RAISED 3 CHILDREN
WITH HIM. I HAVE ALSO BEEN WITH HIM FROM THE BEGINNING EVER SINCE THE
ACCIDENT. I HAVE BEEN THERE FOR HIM AND HAVE HELPED HIM WITH THE PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY THAT HE HAS HAD FROM THE CAR ACCIDENT ANO I DO
KNOVy HOW SORRY HE REALLY IS. HE HAS TOLD ME HE FEELS DEEPLY SORRY FOR
THE FAMILIIES OF THOSE WHOM HAVE DIED BEING A FATHER HIMSELF HE WOULd
NOT KNOW WHAT HE WOULD DO IF IT WAS ONE OF HIS OWN. HE IS A VERY GOOO
FATHER AND IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF HIS CHILDRENS LIVES. HE IS ALSO A VERY
SPECIAL CAMPANION TO ME. I KNOW HE HAS TO PAY FOR WHAT HE HAS DONE BUT
PLEASE DO NOT MAKE HIM PAY FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE. AS IT iS, WHAT HAS
HAPPENED WILL ALWAYS BE A PART OF US AND IS SOMETHING WE AS A FAMILY WILL
NEVER FORGET. LIVING WITH HIM EVERYDAY SINCE THEN I DO KNOW HE IS SORRY
AND HAS LEARNED HIS LESSON, BUT HIS CHILDREN AND I NEED HIM TO HOLD OUR
FAMILY TOGETHER FINANCIALLY AND AS A FATHER AND A HUSBAND.

SINCERELY
CHRISTIE OLDEN

£d Wd£t>:0l 86St ST *""f

9£9£ 6sz see : 'ON SNOW
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

THING AND I KNOW HE REGRETS HIS INVOLVMENT. I DO KNOW HE IS SORRY
AND FEELS FOR THE FAMILIES THAT HAVE LOST LOVE ONES I KNOW MY
BROTHER IS A VERY LOVING PERSON AND HE WOULD NEVER HAVE DONE
ANYTHING LIKE THIS INTENTIONALLY MY CONCERN NOW IS FOR HIS

NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS FAMILY. HIS CHILDREN APE STILL Y O U ^ SO
I HOPE THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO BE RAISED BY THDR OWN FATHER.
HE BRINGS TO OUR FAMILY A STRONG BOND THAT KEEPS US TOGETHER AND CLOSE,

THANK YOU FOR TAKING IN CONSIDERATION OUR FEELINGS
MNi I M I

'^ftwjfahjup*

M -H'.f \i. Bfcfc

|

9C9S 6S? 506 : -DM 3NQHJ

SMS'OU : UCSJ

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This letter is concerning the character of Fred Kataa, I have known Fred]
since 1990. He is a kind and gentle young individual. He knows what he
wants in life, but finds it hard to get there. I have talked to him since he nad
the accident, and I know he regrets what happened, and that he was
responsible for the life's that were lost. Fred has always been a caring
person, since I have known him. He helped with me with my fourteen year
old son when he was getting into trouble at school. He talked with him and
told him he needed to do something with his life now that he was young] He
needed to stay in school and learn as much as he could to have a better lijfc
Fred is a person the younger kids look up to because of his personality and
his concern for the younger kids to respect and listen to their parents, I will
always have the greatest admiration for Fred because he is very intelligent
and knows how to talk to people He is a good person mat I am glad to know
and he will always be my friend. 1 will never forget the way Fred helped me
with my son and my son remembers what Fred did for him. My son is now a
productive 21 year old, with an apartment of his own and a good paying job,
making it on his own. 1 know Fred will be a productive citizen and that the
accident made him more aware of life and what he needs to do and will|do it.

FROM:
VICTORIA VASQUEZ
6805 PALM DR.
LOS ANGELS CALIF. 91701

L, . T\\Or+yp SOK)

169 W 2700 So.

SJLC.UT 84115

Mountain States Trenching, Inc.

Phont* auM*'%.*7*7

FAX 101-486 3770

June 11, 1998
To when It Hay Oonoarns
X » tht Vice President of Mountain States Treodhing# Inc. and have in the
past employed Freddie Xatoa as a Fbramn on our construction crows. He is
a very dependable and loyal employee and X never had to worry about leaving
hia In charge of a project when I had to leave the site,
I know of his trouble regarding the auto accident and the loos of
and I kno« tor a fact that he is very repentant and would change p.
thaee deceased if possible* He has said Chat he vishee he could make i
the families left behind, but know that is impossible also, so he is
to take his punishment and try to do the bast he can now,
I think he has learned a valuable lesson from this tragic ocourajnee and he
oculd aure talk to other youig people and oaytoe Stop them from doing the saos
things he has done and making the ease sdstakas. I think a court could find
oomemy he can be a useful person to society and still pay far his mistakes*
It seeeis like it is a vast* incarcerate him for a long period of time ^nd it
vill not bring back the loved ones who are gone no*.
I hope you can help hin to pay for hi* mistakes and still be a good ciiizen
and not a hardened criminal. 1 have faith in Freddie and I know he will] try.
Sin»?rely f
/*>

I*
S t r i f i il

1

vice President
fountain States TteuUtlj^* IHL.

P 2

fc69 W. 2700 So.

s L . C UT84U5
Phoric fcui.486.373?

r ^ Mountain States Trenching, Inc.

FAX 601-4863770

June 12, 1996
Tto Hhom It Way Concern:
X an writing this letter on behalf of rrad Katca* who vorkad with « let
/fountain States Trenching, inc. for quite a While* and X h a w heard df
his tragic accident, with fatal injuries to other parties. X just want
to aay that Fted was always a nice perean and reliable at work. He vap
in talking to the guys here and he itada the statement *I wish I could
trade place* with the people vho died in that accidant, and that it

Ax*

haa tau^it hiai a leeaon about responsibility when behind a wheel or a]
in a oar."

I hope you can be lenient with hi*, as I feel he haa really learned hla
leeean and will never forget vhat haa happened to him and n n t of alii to
the families of the deceased. He really

SK»OB

to be very depressed about

the lives lost through hia carelessness and he will naver forget it. I
know tie tea to pay for hia mistake, but I hope you can help hi© not tp
become another good peraon that fell through the cracks of life.
I really think he haa learned hla learnt and ia ready to take the punishment
thet ia metea out to him, aa he knows he can not change things
In would like to do so.

sincerely

V
Betty FUentes
Secretary
Mountain States Trenching, Inc.
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Accident Reconstruction and Cause Analysis
P.O. Bo* 1**13 • Silt Like Cityi Utih 841164)613
Phone (801) 973-8756-Fax (801) 292-3597'E-MilI DGLORD@WORLDNETlAl I

JUne

Ms. Deborah Kreech Mendes
Attorney at Law
424 East 500 South #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dear Ms, Mendes;
Ihn investigating j^Q^dent ^nC0netruotionist in the
captioned case calculated the speed of the vehicles to be
in the area of 79 to 81 miles per hour. The metnod used
f n make this calculation was Critical Speed from skid
marks. This is a valid way of determining speed in SOME
cases. What is necessary to correctly use this! concept
is to plot the radius traveled by the Center of Mass (CM)
i f the vehicle.
If the vehicle in question is mQff
Tracking", sliding, as in this case the marks made by
tires no longer reflect the path of the Center of Mass.
Speed estimates from this improper use of the! concept
will ALWAYS produce higher numbers than the vehicle is
actually traveling. Also speeds * 1 he AIMS ox 80 MPH
are beyond the capability of vehicles of this type when
considering the acceleration distance traveled after
negotiating a 90 degree corner. Using the tire marks of
ii sliding car to plot the travel of CM I \ contrary to
Accident Reconstruction teachings and authority*;.
Because the police focused on unit skid mark, obs ejrvations
of evidence that would allow a peed estimate wa s lost,
therefore a reslistic calculation iff impossible.
In regards to physical COntact between the Van and Jeep,
there is a tire scrub on the right side of the Vah
This
mark is similar fm i close parentheses, exampl
This is the mark/shape you would see made b\ p fr bni tire

I

JUN-10-98 MED 01:0Of1

FAX NO.

r. us

being turned left out of it's wheel well/ and coming in
contact with another vehicle. A turn to the right would
leave the opposite mark, * ( M . From this evidence I aan
conclude the Jeep, at some point turned into the!aide of
the Van.
If you have further questions contaot my office.

O

.ncerely,

David 6, Lord
• Northwestern University'a Traffic Institute
Institute'of Police and Technical Management
Society of Automotive Engineers
Accident Reconstruction by Collins
Highway Collision Analysis by Collins £ Morris]
Handbook for the Accident Reconstructionist by Lofgren
Scientific Automobile Accident Reconstruction I by Lacy
& BarEelay
Law and Order Magasine
Computerised Accident Reconstruction
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

Transcript of:
State of Utah

Sentencings
Plaintiff,

vs,
Alfred P. Katoa and Aisea Akauloa

Case Nos. 971016306
971016307

Defendant.

The above entitled cause of action came
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
Stephen L. Henriod, a Judge of the Third District
Court, of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah,
on Monday, July 20, 1998.
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Howard Lemcke
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendants:

Deborah Kreeck Mendez
Legal Defender Association
424 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, :ah
Randall C. Allen
KIRTON 8c McCONKIE
60 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Monday, July 2 0, 19 98

Video transcription

P R O C E E D I N G S
VOICE:

Are you calling these together, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

I prefer to do them together.

Anybody object to having them together?
MR. LEMCKE:

The State has no objection.

MS. KREECK MENDEZ:
THE COURT:
Mendez on Mr. Katoa.

Okay.

No, objection, Your Honor.
We will start with Ms. Kreeck

Is there anything in the Presentence

Report that ought to be corrected?
MS. KREECK MENDEZ:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay, Mr. Allen, how about in

MR. ALLEN:

Nothing, other than the few things I

Akauloa?

mentioned in my statement.

Nothing of a major

significance.
THE COURT:
sentencing.

Then let's go ahead and address

Let me hear again from Ms. Kreeck Mendez

first and then Mr. Allen.
MS. KREECK MENDEZ:

Your Honor, if I might

approach.
THE COURT:

All right.

MS. KREECK MENDEZ:

I would ask if -- this is a

tox report and I'd ask that it be included in the file.

I

2

would like to handle the business end of that first before
we get into what we call "more emotional."
I have submitted these because there is a real,
very real possibility of prison today.

I have submitted

this and the accident reconstructionist's statement. I
will be the only lawyer Alfred can ever have.

He will

never be able to afford a lawyer in this case.
already a civil litigation pending.

There is

I am submitting these

because I think they may make a difference to the parole
board, if that is in fact what happens here, and the
parole board only considers on their first review the
matters that are in the file. Additionally, I want the*
court file to fully reflect the situation in this case
because there is going to be litigation.

I know there

will be restitution orders, but there is an insurance
company that has already filed an action and served
Alfred in this matter.
I will ask the families of the victims here and
the victims and the court to please be patient.

I would

like to remind everyone that I have a job to do and my job
is not discounting the victims but to present Alfred's
position, his side, his feelings on this, fully and
completely.

So as I am going through statements and it

may sound like I am minimizing the tragedy that occurred
here, I am not.

The police investigated from their

3

perspective.

We investigated from Alfred's perspective.

The tragedy here has never been questioned by anyone at
all, but I need to make the record and I need to present
the full picture here so we have what the police
investigated, in addition to what Alfred has talked to me
about, and what our investigator came up with.
I tell you right upfront, Your Honor, what I
would prefer the court to do is to give Alfred two years
in jail.

No credit for time served.

No good time and

have him completely serve those, and then he be placed on
probation after that.

The matrix is an alternative

recommendation and in any other case I would feel
confident that that is the way the court would go.
However, the tragedy is immense here, but I would ask the
court to please keep that recommendation in mind.

If the

court is not inclined to go that way, we would ask at
least for a concurrent sentence in this matter.
These cases are probably the hardest for me to
work with, these alcohol-related accidents or accidents of
any kind because you don't have malice.

You don't have

people running around in anger, and everybody, it is a
tragedy.

Alfred's friends and family go gone.

He has -,

made his remarks to some people personally, some of the
victims, some of the victim's family.

He wants to make

some remarks today at the close of my arguments to those

4

people he hasn't talked to before.
I think it is critical that we let the court
know and the family know that our investigation indicated
that the speed was substantially less than the police
indicated and as you saw in the accident reconstruction
comments.

It was still in excess of the appropriate speed

there, particularly in light of the fact that it was a
busy day, that the street was crowded.

They were not

racing.
THE COURT:

How about the police findings that

they were actually smashing into each other car?
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Well, that is my next point
is, what happened here is they were not drag racing.
Aisea passed, Alfred passed, they were losing control of
each other.

There is no doubt that their behavior was

irresponsible.

And we have this tox report where there-is

not a lot of alcohol.

It is .02, but it doesn't excuse

the extreme conduct here that should not have been
occurring.
At every meeting I have had with Alfred, every
meeting, he talks about how this was completely avoidable.
That he should not have been trying to get back around
Aisea.

They shouldn't have been even passing there, and

he knows that. And so when I talk about these things, I
want the specifics known but it is not that Alfred says he

5

didn't do anything wrong.

He set into motion a tremendous

tragedy here, a busy day, a parked semi, a lot of people
and an enormous, enormous tragedy.

One of the worst in

our valley's history as far as car accidents go.
I want to make it clear.

In the report it

talks about how he doesn't have much memory.
from alcohol.

That is not

Alfred was extremely injured in this whole

case, and some pieces have come back.

I remember talking

to him in the jail shortly after the accident occurred,
and him talking about, "I remember the trees waving."
That is his memory of the accident initially.
The officer said that he hasn't been helpful.
I don't know how he can say that and listen to the tape.
He talked in the hospital while he was still injured.

He

didn't ask for a lawyer, and he knew he could ask for a
lawyer.

They told him that.

with officers.

He spoke in the hospital

They came into his house when he was

convalescing after being at home.
ties to Tonga.

He could have walked at any time.

family who was willing to help him.
California.

Alfred has significance
He had

He has ties in

As a matter of fact, he was in California.

He could have walked at any time but he has throughout
been here and been prepared to take responsibility for
this case.
Which brings me to, I would like to thank the

6

court and Ms. Stoic (phonetic) and the victims who allowed
us to continue that.

When Alfred was picked up on traffic

warrants in California, which dated back to '90 and '94,
this was continued.
up here.

Those were all cleared.

He came back

The reason he is in California, and I know that

the media was concerned about that, is Alfred is
realistic.

While I am asking for two years on probation

and then probation, even at that he cannot provide for his
family.

He got out on bond and stayed in jail for quite a

period of time.

He got out on a property bond and he has

been working and putting money away, and he moved his
family, his three children and his common-law wife down to
California to live with his mother, to be where they can
be supported and cared for, knowing that that means, for
whatever period of incarceration he must go through, there
will be no contact from them.

As a matter of fact, he

said, "I don't want my children to see me in prison
because it is more important what happens with them than
what happens with me."
I think that shows the kind of person that Alfred
is.

I think it shows what he has done.

This event has

been a life-changing experience for him, as it has been
for everyone in the audience here today.
loss.

A loss of his physical work.

A tremendous

He will be able to

work but not at the level he once was. A loss of family
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and friends. A loss of a sense of peace.
be able to live this down.

Ever.

He will never

And in all of our

conversations he has talked about that.
We ask to do medication in this case and I
don't think the families are quite ready for it, as much
for Alfred as for them, to tell them how he feels. He
wants the families to know that even if he goes to prison,
that offer is always available.
yell at him.
they want.

In mediation they can

They can talk to him.

They can do whatever

They have a social worker sitting there that

is working with the victim.

It can be a tremendous outlet

and actually I thought it would help Alfred because he
can't forgive himself.
that.

He is having a very hard time with

I have never worked with a client with a greater

remorse for greater understanding in the situation.
We would ask the court to have a restitution
hearing in this matter.

There is a lot still out there

and he is not going to have representation.

If the court

decides to send him to prison, he will not have
representation before the Board of Pardons.
Alfred - - a lot of people would say, "That is a
lot of money.

I'll never pay it." Alfred's comments

throughout have always been -- There is an insurer in this
case.

There is a debate as to whether the vehicle is

still insured.

Whether it was in fact lapsed or just at

8

that midway period.

That is why they filed suit against

Alfred.
So there are some issues that I would ask that we
present to this court.

I believe we probably can work it

out with Mr. Lemcke but should the court decide prison is
appropriate in this case, I would not want him to go to
prison with an open ended figure.
would be fair to anyone.

I don't think that

We would like to at least have

some resolution so we would ask this court.
Finally, I have probably the biggest request in
this case.

Of all the things I have seen, Alfred is

probably one of the best father's I have ever known.

He

is very concerned and I think that is where his remorse
and his understanding and empathy for the victims come
from because he is such a good family person.
his kids.

His wife is due on April 13th.

have her babies two weeks early.

He loves

She typically

I would ask the court to

consider setting this sentence over until she has the baby
and have him respond.
THE COURT:

You mean August instead of April?

MS. KREECK MENDEZ: August, I am sorry.
the 13th.

August

We know that all the other victims are not

going to see their children.
these events.

They are not going to see

We know that and we empathize with that,

but we would ask the court to consider, in light of the

9

fact this case is not a case of malice.
irresponsibility.

It is a case of

A case of numerous factors coming

together all at once.

Not all in Aisea's control.

all in Alfred's control.

Not

Granted, Alfred had the

principal control here, but the catastrophic nature of
this event came from many, many factors coming together,
and we would ask the court to consider that.
Should he go to prison, the Board of Pardons
would have ample time to work with him, even if they make
him serve most of the sentence, four and a half years,
they would still be able to keep him on parole after that
for a considerable period of time.

It would put him in a

position to be paying money back more quickly and that is
important for some of these people.

A lot of the victims

didn't respond and I don't know why that is, but those are
the very victims that I think.

And some of them are truly

sympathetic with Mr. Gotay (phonetic) and he has made his
peace one-on-one with them.

But these people still need

money.
Alfred is capable of making money.

He is good

at making a lot of money and putting it away to try and
take care of his family right now.

I know the rest of the

families need some care.
We would ask that you at least sentence this
concurrently.

That we give the Board plenty of time to

- 10

work with this and punishment in light of the facts.
is the State's recommendation as a concurrent.

That

I think

the State and myself more than anyone and Mr. Allen have
delved into this case knowing the nuances of the case,
know the facts of this case.

There is a lot going on.

That is not to minimize Alfred's control.

There is a lot

going on.
Alfred would like to address the court and the
victims.

Would you want him to do that now or after

hearing from the State?
THE COURT:

Now is fine.

MR. KATOA:

This is a harder time for me.

I am

happy that I got this opportunity to say these things.

To

the families that were involved, to everyone that had me
come up with them because of the situation, I know that
sorry is inadequate.

(Unintelligible) hours back.

I know that sorry is just so inadequate.

I

know each and every one of you, if I could I would replace
their lives with mine.

I don't want you to think that I

did this not caring, not thinking maybe, but absolutely
not caring.
If I knew the outcome of that day, I would have
never acted in that way as I did.

I just want to say I am

sorry to each and every one of you that have lost.
I can tell you, I would like for mediation.
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That would be easier for me if I did this, hear from you,
and let you vent your frustrations towards me.

Again, I

am sorry.
THE COURT:

Mr. Lemcke, did you want to argue now

or let Mr. Allen go first?
MR. LEMCKE:

I will let Mr. Allen go first, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Allen.

MR. ALLEN:

Uh, I would echo many of the things

that Ms. Kreeck Mendez said with regard to the recommended
matrix and with regard to willingness to have a mediation
to discuss things and also with regard to the restitution
hearing.
THE COURT:

Mr. Akauloa's record is significantly

worse than Mr. Katoa's.

Mr. Akauloa had a very similar

incident within just a couple of years of this incident.
He also had a much higher blood alcohol level than Mr.
Katoa.

Frankly, I see them in a little different light.

You might want to address those things.
MR. ALLEN:

Well, uh, it is hard to respond.

You

are right that there are those prior things there and
those reflect poorly on Aisea.

All I can offer is that,

uh, apparently he didn't learn his lesson and he
understands that that means that he may have a stiffer
punishment.

He is very sorry.

He accepts responsibility
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for this.

He wishes he could do something to right the

wrong.
He has tried to cooperate from the beginning.
He gave a full statement to the detective immediately
following, without an attorney.

He pleaded guilty at

another stage to the counts to which he has pleaded
guilty, and with the recommendation of the concurrent
sentences from the prosecution.
He did undergo a treatment course on his own
for alcohol earlier this year.

Of course, none of this

makes amends for what happened.
I would offer to the court that Aisea is young.
And the other comment that I have is that he is married to
his wife Josephine who is here today and that they are, I
mentioned this in my witness statement, they are expecting
a little boy and I would ask the court to consider the
impact of added years of separation on that child.
Aisea wants to address the court and the
victims.

Just in conclusion, he is extremely sorry for

what happened and is prepared to receive his judgment.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You want to go ahead,

Mr. Akauloa.
MR. AKAULOA:

First of all, to the families of

Robert and Helene Sherlin, Amanki Moala, Selanito Sitani,
and Sione Pilivi, I truly am sorry.

I accept full
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responsibility for the things I have done that has caused
this great tragedy.
back.

I know apologies can't bring nothing

But as I am standing here, not a day goes by that I

don't think about the victims.
My thoughts are earlier, if I could have gave
my life for all of them to live, I would in a heart beat,
the job that I have.

I truly am sorry.

If not today,

sometime if you find in your heart to forgive me, I would
like the mediation hearings where we can vent our
frustrations.
Secondly, I would like to apologize to my
family.

Also thank them for standing by me at this time.

That is it.
THE COURT:
MR. LEMCKE:

Thank you.

Mr. Lemcke.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor

there are, I have been informed, three members of the
Sherlin family who asked to address the court.

Is the

court inclined to hear them?
THE COURT:

Certainly.

If you folks would like

to stand up and -MR. LEMCKE:

Go up to the podium if you would and

identify yourself by name for the record and your
relationship to the victims in this case.
THE COURT:

I want to tell you folks, I have read

all of the letters that were submitted to me and there
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were many that were very positive about your parents. I
have also viewed the video which you prepared.
VOICE:

My name is Robert Sherlin.

oldest son of Robert and Helene Sherlin.

I am the

I would like to

share with you, some of this would be redundant from the
letters, but I would like the defendants to hear it as
well.

I will try not to take too much time in my

comments.
The day the accident took place, the day my
mother was killed, was my wife and I's 15th wedding
anniversary, which has stolen the joy from that day away
from us forever.
a week later.
his coma.

Mom died at the accident scene; dad died

We stayed beside him.

He never woke from

After discussing the matter with the ICU

physician, the surviving children made a decision to turn
dad's life support off.

We were with him as he expired.

At least we got to tell him good-bye and to hold him.
That was not a possibility with my mother.

Her injuries

were too severe to allow us to ever see her again.

The

last time I ever saw her was at the Salt Lake airport as
we were leaving from Christmas to return to our home in
Houston.

Hugging and waving good-bye, if I had only known

what was going to happen, I would have stayed longer.
Bob and Helene are gone because of these men's
criminal acts.

What happened was in no way an accident.
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I have heard it characterized that way.

What they did is

the equivalent of firing a loaded gun haphazardly into a
crowd.

Does the fact that the gunman did not take actual

aim, wasn't his responsibilities for his actions?
death of my parents was not an accident.

No, the

Both of these

men behaved in an extremely reckless and deadly fashion.
Either one of them could have backed down and behaved in a
rationale and civilized fashion.

Neither did.

I submit that the (inaudible) accident which
could have resulted from their behalf was if they
accidentally had not killed someone.
you have no place in society.
parents and through others.
arrests in the past.

These individuals

They took the lives of my
I understand that they have a

That was brought up.

Sadly for my

mom and dad, it appears no lessons were learned from their
past mistakes.

I am concerned that none will be learned

this time.
They have failed to accept the most fundamental
responsibilities that our society requests of its members.
They were racing at high speeds down residential streets,
they drove recklessly down the wrong side of these
streets, they climbed behind the wheel while drunk,
neither owned the car they were driving, neither had auto
insurance.

My family, my parents' estate is now under

attack by insurance companies trying to recoup monies lost

16

from this accident.

Money means nothing to us.

I don't want these people's money.
Based on all of this, I would request that the
two defendants receive the maximum penalty possible under
law.

This will not serve to punish them for what they

have done.

It will serve to punish them but it also

protects society for the brief period they will be away.
I realize the punishment of these men will not bring my
parents back, however, their sentencing will serve an
important step toward my family's closure to this whole
tragedy.
I also have a letter here from my 13-year-old
daughter expressing her loss at these men's, but you have
received that letter from them.

I prefer to just read

just the very first paragraph for the defendants, if that
is okay with you, Your Honor.

I don't want to take too

much time here.
This is the words of my 13-year-old daughter
(inaudible):
July 4, 1997.
her.

"I have been through many things since
I celebrated my grandma's birthday without

I celebrated Thanksgiving without my grandparents.

I tried to have a mere Christmas without them.
13 without my grandmother to talk to.
year.

I turned

I celebrated a new

I went to my first dance.
I have been through many other painful
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occurrences since July 4th.

My grandmother died.

grandfather was in a coma for six days; he died.

My
I went

to my first two funerals, within a week of each other.
They are people I deeply loved.

I have gone through this

due to the actions of two people.

They killed my grandma

and my grandpa and part of my life."
THE COURT:
VOICE:

Thank you, Mr. Sherlin.

My name is Carol Hillard.

and Robert's daughter.

I am Helene

It is impossible to describe to

you the impact that their death has had on me and my
family in the last year.

You would have to see the anger

in the book each day when we get mad at each other for
every little thing.

We have to continue to remind

ourselves it is not our fault that this happened.
else killed them.

Someone

You would have to feel the physical

pain and heaviness on my chest to realize they are really
gone and I will never be able to talk to them, laugh with,
look to them for advise, understanding and support.
I will never be able to touch or hug them again.

And that

pain I cannot describe to you.
You would have to be there in the middle of the
night when I lay in bed and cry for all the things about
them I miss so desperately and the emptiness that I feel.
It is unbearable.

You would have to be there when I have

nightmares of the accident and relive every moment from
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the time my brother called me to each of my parent's
funerals.

It is a nightmare that will never go away and

will be with me for the rest of my life.

You would have

to be there to see the look in my son's eyes when we talk
about grandma and grandpa and all the special things that
they did together; all the things that they shared.

He

was robbed of these two wonderful people being part of his
life, to share in his achievements and to support him in
his failures.

It has left a huge whole in his young life

and it is hard to explain to him why this had to happen.
It didn't have to happen.
Either of these people could have stopped this
accident at any time.

Both of them were barely at the

legal limit of alcohol.
cared to admit.

They had more control than they

These two people that killed my parents

have continued to be in trouble with the law even after
the accident.

You would think that in some way they would

try to give something back to society after the horrible
devastation that they caused.
so.

They have not chosen to do

They say "actions speak louder than words,11 and I see

no indication of good intent.

I can't help but be made to

think that if they had to take responsibility for crimes
and not passed, my parents and the other three victims
would still be alive.
I ask you to give these people the maximum 10
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years in prison, to make them really think their path in
life.

To keep them out of society and insure that no one

else has to go through what the nightmare my family has
had to go through, and the families of the other victims.
I just no, Your Honor, if there is any question about the
speed, just seeing the accident and the destruction on the
car, there should be no question as to how fast these
people were going.

They know how important it is being

parents and why are my parents were such a huge part of my
life and I am sorry it doesn't take that back.
VOICE:
Sherlin man.

(William Sherlin)

Thank you.

I am the William

I am the youngest child of Robert and

Helene and at 33 when they died, they were not only my
parents, they were people I knew.

They were good people.

They were as law abiding as you could ever want people to
be.

And I know that these men will lives with their

deaths, But at least they will live.

Giving them the

maximum that they have bargained for isn't nearly enough.
There was a mistake that was not intent but the result is
still the same and we still don't have our parents, our
friends and the friends of many people in this courtroom.
And I just ask that this is not the time to slap them on
the wrist, not the time to give them a warning, and not
the time to say that "I hope you have learned from this."
This is a time to give them the maximum and I hope you
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feel that way too.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Lemcke, were there

any other victims that wish to speak.
MR. LEMCKE:

(inaudible)

Let me ask, are there

any representatives of the family Sione Pilivi that would
like to speak?

(Pause)

Are there any representatives of

the family of Selanito Sitani who would like to speak.
(Pause)

Are there any representatives of the family of

Amanki Moala who would like to speak.

(Pause)

Your Honor, a couple of mechanical matters
first.

One, on the restitution, counsel is correct that

they are entitled to a restitution hearing.

I don't

believe that in terms of the equities and the subrogations
of the various insurers that are involved, that would be
before us at a restitution hearing.

I think that the

absolute amount of damage would be; but in terms of
whether or not one of the cars was in lapse or insured,
that is not for us.

That is for a different forum to

examine.
Counsels do correctly state our recommendations
in this case.
When you have three major factors that a
prosecutor will argue* to a judge in terms of sentence, one
of them is past record, one of them is quality of conduct,
and one is the extent of the damage done. And in this
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case even had there been no past record, even had the
quality of the conduct been almost benign, nonetheless the
third factor, the amount of damage done, there were five
people killed here.
here.

There was Helene Sherlin was killed

Robert Sherlin was killed here.

killed here.

Sione Pilivi was

Selanito Sitani was killed here, and Amanki

Moala was killed here, a year this coming Friday on our
State Holiday.

The extent of the damage done makes this a

present case.
The question I believe is before Your Honor is
the question of consecutive vs. concurrent.

As you

stated, the records are not equal here of the two
defendants, and further, although it may seem that it is
punishing to Mr. Katoa, his wife, perhaps more so than to
him, I would ask the court to go ahead and sentence today,
get the sentences started today, simply because this case
needs some finality.
THE COURT:

Ms. Kreeck Mendez, Mr. Allen, any

final words?
MS. KREECK MENDEZ:

Your Honor, I would just like

to clarify, and in all honesty it is more for it is going
to be in the newspaper tomorrow, than anything else.
There has been no continuing criminal.
family to California.

Alfred moved his

He was riding with someone else who

had a car violation, an equipment violation.

As is
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standard practice, you need a license and information is
taken on both people and Alfred had old warrants.

There

has been no continuing criminal activity.
THE COURT:

Mr. Akauloa has at least a pending

charge of activity subsequent to this.
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: As to the restitution, I am
in complete agreement with Mr. Lemcke and I in no way want
to pull out civil (inaudible).

As I told you, there is a

civil matter pending, but I do want a firm number to go
forward with whatever happens after this, particularly
where we are dealing with the Board of Pardons.

The Board

of Pardons, their restitution hearings are much different
than what is available here.

I can work with Mr. Lemcke

and we can get a firm figure to go forward with.

That can

be handled in whatever situation you place Mr. Katoa in
today.
And finally, I know it is hard for the victims
and Alfred is not really expecting you to give him his
extra time.

Christy would very much like him to be there

for the birth.

He has been there for the birth of each of

his other three children.
ask.

And Alfred said he would just

So it is not that he expects it.

He knows it is

huge.
THE COURT:

You have asked.

Mr. Allen.

MR. ALLEN:

The expected date, as I say, is quite
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a ways off.
that.

So we haven't asked (inaudible) because of

I would just reiterate what I said before.
THE COURT:

Well, this is a difficult case from

my perspective as I started reviewing it, and I am not
going to give a lecture today.

I don't see any point in

that.
It is clear that, particularly Mr. Katoa, is not
as evil as some of the people I see here in court.
Mr. Akauloa is worse.

There is no question, Mr. Akauloa,

your record shows much more serious criminal activity in
the past and also this other incident where you were lucky
you didn't kill anybody, just a couple of years before
this one.

But you both have serious records.

You both

have had the kind of prior conduct and the kind of
consequences of that conduct that should have taught you
better.

Again Mr. Akauloa, more so than Mr. Katoa.
Since this incident, you both have behaved

responsibly and appropriately and I am going to give you
credit for that.
remorse.

I think I am hearing very sincere

It is too late but it is obviously sincere and

you obviously care deeply.
Mr. Lemcke mentioned the three areas that
compare.

Starting with the worst one, no matter what your

daily lives are like and your families are like, you have
caused incredible damage.

You have caused incredible

24

damage as a direct result of your almost absolute and
total disregard for the lives and the safety of other
people.

Terrible damage.

You both had been drinking.

You both had been smoking marijuana.

You both had been

arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes and
drug crimes.
I do see a difference in prior record and
conduct.

I see Mr. Akauloa as more culpable but not

sufficiently more culpable to get a different sentence.
I am going to sentence you each to zero to 5
years on each of the two counts you pled guilty to and I
am going to send you to prison on each sentence
consecutive to the other sentences.

It will be up to the

Board of Pardons to determine when you are out.
This order is also going to include a full
restitution order and I am going to leave that issue open
for a period of 12 months and I am going to award a
$500.00 recoupment fee on each case.
the services of your attorneys.
sentences.

They will be forthwith

You will both go in today.
(Hearing concluded)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCE OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION
TO AMEND JUDGMENT

v.
ALFRED P. KATOA,

Case No. 971016306FS
JUDGE HENRIOD

Defendant.

Defendant, ALFRED P. KATOA, by and through his counsel of record, DEBORAH KREECK
MENDEZ and RONALD S. FUJINO of Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, moves this court to
correct the illegal sentence, or in the alternative, moves that this court amend the judgment entered
on the aforementioned case.
On July 2 0 , 1998, Mr. Katoa was sentenced by this Court to two consecutive terms of 0-5
years in the Utah State Prison for automobile homicide. Mr. Katoa requests this Court reconsider
this judgment and commitment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), allowing he
Court to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. In the alternative Mr.
Katoa argues that this matter may be addressed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).'
This Court entered consecutive sentences on the basis of the loss of life and injuries incurred

'Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81 (e) allows application of Civil rules in criminal matters when no
controlling criminal rule exists.
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through Mr. Katoa and Mr. Akauola's actions.

Utah law requires that in issuing a consecutive

sentence the Court must consider the gravity and circumstances of the offense and the history,
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401 ( 3 ) .
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that Utah Law favors concurrent sentencing. State v.
Galii, slip op. filed June 16, 1 9 9 8 .

The court in Galli emphasized the 2-part consideration in

determining whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently: the gravity and
circumstances of the offense and factors regarding the defendant. The court in Galli noted that the
Galli case had mitigating factors that the trial court did not adequately consider.
As in Galli, the offenses in this matter are very serious. However, unlike Gain's 3-first degree
felonies, Mr. Katoa is convicted of 2 third degree felonies. Further, while Mr. Katoa's conduct was
negligent and criminal, it was not a knowing or intentional crime, it was not a crime for personal gain
and was not a crime of malice.

Mr. Katoa does not contest that the losses in this matter are

immense, only that mitigating factors require a concurrent sentence.

Like Mr. Galli, Mr. Katoa

voluntarily confessed and accepted responsibility from the earliest point when he was interviewed by
police in the hospital.

He admitted more use of alcohol and marijuana than toxicology reports

documented.
Further, Mr. Katoa's prior record included only prior misdemeanors.

Perhaps the most

compelling evidence in favor of concurrent sentencing is Mr. Katoa's acceptance of responsibility and
mature manner of preparing for resolution of this matter. Mr. Katoa spent quality time with his
family, was employed in a hard labor position, in spite of his physical impairment and pain from the
accident, and most self sacrificing, moved his family to California where they will have emotional and
financial support. He voluntarily returned to Court with his wife and family to accept responsibility,
and had tremendous remorse and concern for the families of those who died and were injured. He
apologized to those who wished to speak to him even before pleading guilty. This man has been
extremely productive since this tragic event while recovering from serious and permanent injuries.
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It is clear that Mr. Katoa is capable of complete rehabilitation. Mr. Katoa's behavior in the
past year demonstrates that he is willing and has, in fact, made dramatic changes in his life.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Katoa respectfully requests that the Court alter or amend its
judgment and commitment to provide for concurrent sentences.
DATED this

h? day of July, 1998.

J WU~
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorneys Office, 231
East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ,^fdav of July, 1998.
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